PREM

13

MIDDLE EAST

1624

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
CC (67) 68th Conclusions Minute 2 (Extract)	23.11.67
CC (67) 64th Conclusions Minute 2 (Extract)	9.11.67

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TEL NO. 1086 2 NOVEMBER 67

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ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO. 1086 OF 2 NOVEMBER REPTD FOR INFMN TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST.

I ASKED M. COUVE DE MURVILLE TO-DAY HOW HE SAW THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE NEW TO SAY. THERE HAD BEEN THE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES WITH MR. KOSYGIN. HE HAD BEEN GRATEFUL FOR THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY RECEIVED THROUGH THE FRENCH EMBASSY. THE QUAI WOULD INFORM US OF THE GENERAL'S REPLY, WHICH HAD BEEN ON THE SAME LINES. (WE ARE FOLLOWING THIS UP.) THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO GET A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT THE DIFFICULTY LAY WITH THE AMERICANS, WHO WERE BECOMING MORE AND MORE INFLEXIBLE IN SUPPORTING THE ISRAELIS.

2. I SAID THAT WE HAD NOTICED THE REFERENCE IN THE GENERAL'S SPEECH DURING THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN TO RECOGNITION, THE ENDING OF BELLIGERENCE AND FREE NAVIGATION FOR ALL. DID THE LAST POINT RELATE TO THE SUEZ CANAL AS WELL AS TO THE STRAIT OF TIRAN? M. COUVE CONFIRMED THAT IT DID, ALTHOUGH ITS APPLICATION TO THE CANAL MIGHT COME LATER IN TIME. IT WAS ACADEMIC AT PRESENT IN ANY CASE.

FO PASS PRIORITY WASHINGTON 281 MOSCOW 79 UKMIS NEW YORK 88
ROUTINE TO TEL AVIV 27 CAIRO 6 AMMAN 13 AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO 246.

SIR P REILLY

[REPETITION TO CAIRO DEFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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CYPHER: CAT 'A'
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2988 2 NOVEMBER
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2988 OF 2 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN,
TEL AVIV AND CAIRO AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.
MY TELEGRAM NO. 2966.
MIDDLE EAST.

WE EXPECT TO GET THE REPORT OF THE TEN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL VERY SOON (POSSIBLY LATER TODAY) AND, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE TAKEN THE LINE IN SPEAKING TO EVERYONE THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO COMMENT ON ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION UNTIL THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS HAVE COMPLETED THEIR DISCUSSIONS. BUT WHEN THE REPORT OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS IS AVAILABLE WE SHALL HAVE TO BE IN A POSITION TO STATE OUR VIEWS ON THE QUESTIONS STILL AT ISSUE. IT MAY BE THAT FOR A SHORT TIME WE CAN KEEP OUR VIEWS ON THOSE QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS BUT VERY SOON NOW OUR VIEWS, WHICH MAY WELL BE DECISIVE, MUST BE KNOWN AND STATED.

2. IT MAY BE HELPFUL, THEREFORE, IF WE TRY TO SORT OUT WHAT THE MAIN QUESTIONS TO BE DECIDED ARE. THEY ARE MAINLY TWO. FIRST THE FORMULA ON WITHDRAWAL AND SECOND THE FORM OF MANDATE TO BE GIVEN TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

3. ON WITHDRAWAL, AS YOU KNOW, THE PROVISION IN THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT AT THE MOMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

''OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY MILITARY CONQUEST IS INADMISSABLE UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., AND CONSEQUENTLY ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CONFLICT''.

THE PROVISION IN THE DANISH TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS :

''THAT THE SOVEREIGN EXISTENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA SHOULD BE RESPECTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED, AND THAT NONE OF THE STATES IN THE AREA SHOULD MAINTAIN

/FORCES

FORCES ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE AGAINST ITS WILL, OR PERSIST IN REFUSING TO WITHDRAW THEM.''

4. THE ARABS ARE DETERMINED TO GET WORDING WHICH PROVIDES FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE CONFLICT INCLUDING JERUSALEM AND THE GAZA STRIP, WHEREAS THE ISRAELIS NATURALLY WISH TO GET SOME MUCH VAGUER DEFINITION WHICH WILL NOT PRECLUDE FRONTIER VARIATIONS AND IN PARTICULAR WILL NOT COVER JERUSALEM AND GAZA.

5. WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE DATE KNOCKED OUT (4 JUNE), AND BASING OURSELVES ON OUR PREVIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT WE COULD ACCEPT THE WORDING ''WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE CONFLICT''. WE SHOULD MUCH PREFER TO SEE ''ALL'' OMITTED IN ORDER TO LEAVE ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION ON FRONTIER ADJUSTMENTS BUT IN VIEW OF WHAT WE HAVE PUBLICLY SAID IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIGHT ON THIS.

6. IT IS ON THIS PRINCIPAL ISSUE THAT WE WOULD SPECIALLY WELCOME YOUR EARLY DIRECTION.

7. ON THE SECOND QUSESTION OF THE MANDATE FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE THE AFRO-ASIAN WORDING IS :

''REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESPATCH A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA WHO WOULD CONTACT THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN ORDER /TO COORDINATE EFFORTS/ TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF THIS RESOLUTION.....''

WHEREAS THE DANISH WORDING IS :

''REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

(A) TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PROCEED TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH ALL THE STATES CONCERNED WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING THEM IN THE WORKING OUT OF SOLUTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION....''

8. THE ARABS AIM WOULD BE TO REQUIRE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO IMPLEMENT DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHILE THE ISRAELIS WOULD OF COURSE PREFER THAT ALL THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE TO ASSIST IN BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

/9.....

9. WE THINK THAT SOME WORDING LIKE ''TO COORDINATE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES STATED IN THIS RESOLUTION'' WOULD BE BEST. WE WISH TO LEAVE MAXIMUM FREEDOM TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN CARRYING OUT HIS MANDATE.

10. IT WOULD BE A VERY GREAT HELP TO US IF WE COULD KNOW VERY SOON YOUR VIEWS ON THESE TWO MAIN ISSUES.

FO PASS PARIS NO. 511, MOSCOW NO. 520, AMMAN NO. 390, TEL AVIV 534, CAIRO NO. 127 AND SAVING TO BEIRUT NO. 130.

LORD CARADON

[REPETITION TO CAIRO, REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2991 2 NOVEMBER
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2991 OF 2 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, AMMAN
TEL AVIV, CAIRO AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 2988.

MIDDLE EAST.

IN SPITE OF TWO LONG MEETINGS TODAY THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS DRAFTING GROUP (DENMARK, ARGENTINA AND INDIA) WERE UNABLE TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT ON A COMMON TEXT.

2. THEY HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AS A WHOLE THAT THE AFRO-ASIAN AND DANISH PROPOSALS SHOULD BOTH BE SUBMITTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TOGETHER WITH AN EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH PREVENTED AN AGREEMENT. THE DRAFTING GROUP ARE NOW DRAFTING THIS EXPLANATION WHICH MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE EITHER VERY LATE TONIGHT OR FIRST THING TOMORROW TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION TO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS, NO DOUBT AFTER DISCUSSION WITH ALL TEN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS.

3. MEANWHILE THE ARABS AND INDIANS HAVE BEEN MEETING TO CONSIDER WHAT TO DO NEXT. BOTH ARE THINKING OF CALLING THE COUNCIL TO MEET SOON.

4. THE ARABS THINK THEY HAVE EIGHT VOTES FOR THEIR TEXT, NAMELY THE SOVIET UNION, BULGARIA, INDIA, NIGERIA, MALI, ARGENTINA, FRANCE AND ETHIOPIA. THEY ARGUE THAT ONCE THE COUNCIL IS CALLED BRAZIL, CANADA AND THE U.K. WILL NOT BE ABLE TO STAND OUT AND WILL SOON JOIN THEIR RANKS IN VOTING FOR SOMETHING LIKE THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT.

/5.

5. WE MUST BE ALIVE TO THIS DANGER, BUT I DOUBT IF THE RUSSIANS WILL SUPPORT A MOVE TO GO STRAIGHT TO THE COUNCIL WITHOUT FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 522, AMMAN NO. 392, TEL AVIV NO. 536, CAIRO NO. 129 AND PARIS NO. 513 AND SAVING TO BEIRUT NO. 132.

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 11459 2 NOVEMBER 1967 (E)

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ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 11459 OF 2 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND AMMAN.
FOLLOWING FROM BRENCHLEY.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 3426: KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT.
AT HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING KING HUSSEIN WENT OVER MUCH THE SAME GROUND AS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE YESTERDAY (OUR TELEGRAM NO. 5877 TO UKMIS NEW YORK). HE MADE NO FRESH POINTS OF SUBSTANCE. HE AGAIN STRESSED THE GRAVITY OF THE CHOICE FACING THE MIDDLE EAST, THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT, AND THE GENUINE WILL OF HIMSELF AND PRESIDENT NASSER TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH ONE.

2. KING HUSSEIN ELABORATED A LITTLE ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE AS HE HAD FOUND IT ON HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN PRESSING THE ARABS TO ACCEPT THAT ISRAEL WAS THERE TO STAY, HAD BEEN URGING RESTRAINT, AND HAD OFFERED HELP IN GETTING THEM OUT OF THEIR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.
3. THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD KING HUSSEIN THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO LET HIM HAVE THREE HUNTERS RIGHT AWAY. THESE COULD BE EITHER AIRCRAFT IN FIRST CLASS CONDITION OR ONES AT PRESENT IN SERVICE WITH THE R A F WHICH HAD HAD SOME WEAR AND WOULD BE CORRESPONDINGLY CHEAPER. THESE AIRCRAFT REPRESENTED THREE HUNTERS DUE FOR DELIVERY TO THE SAUDIS AND RELEASED BY THEM IN FAVOUR OF THE JORDANIANS. THE R A F WOULD PREFER THE JORDANIANS TO TAKE THE SECOND HAND MACHINES BUT ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE THE OTHERS.

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Dec 1964

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Extract from

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 5.00 p.m. ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6.

Present:-

The Prime Minister	Mr. Abba Eban
Mr. T.F. Brenchley	The Israeli Ambassador
Mr. A.M. Palliser	Mr. Y. Anug

The talk began with an exchange about the present position at the United Nations. Mr. Eban said that the new American Draft Resolution seemed broadly acceptable. The Israeli Government were concerned to ensure that no resolution should be passed that inhibited their main purpose, namely that frontiers should first be fixed by a peace treaty and that withdrawals to those frontiers should be made after the conclusion of the treaty. The American Draft, in his view, was not in contradiction with this principle. He had not heard the outcome of Mr. Goldberg's meeting with Mr. Kuznetsov. The American attitude was that a successful outcome depended on the views of the parties concerned. The Russians seemed disposed to be more intransigent in their demands than the parties in the area. The real problem was the attitude of the U.A.R. Foreign Minister. He had not up-to-date information about this. On the wording of the Draft, he would have preferred reference to "agreed solutions". But this Draft, as opposed to the Afro-Asian Draft which they had much disliked, did not prejudice the Israeli position. The Prime Minister commented that the

Top copy on Brad Jan 66

British and Israeli attitudes towards earlier Drafts had not been in complete agreement. But one of the main purposes of the present Draft was to ensure that a special representative went rapidly to the area.

Mr. Eban said that, under this Draft, negotiators should have a chance to work out a settlement. The fallacy at an earlier stage had been to attempt to solve the problems before any direct negotiations between the parties. Israel's requirement for a better structure of security in the area and for recognition were known. They certainly hoped to negotiate with both Jordan and Egypt, and of course with Syria, though this was perhaps of less immediate importance.

The Prime Minister raised the question of possible demilitarised zones. Mr. Eban said that they would require a territorial adjustment with Syria. They could not tolerate in the future a situation in which Syrians on the hills dominated Israeli territory. The end result might well be a mixture of some form of demilitarised zone coupled with frontier revisions. As regards the Gaza Strip, their view was that the boundary between Egypt and Israel must be on the basis of an accepted International frontier. They could not tolerate the continuation of the "finger in our stomach". The U.A.R. Foreign Minister had said publicly that Gaza had never been part of Egypt. But the U.A.R. might, for prestige reasons, prefer the Gaza Strip to have some form of tutelary status under Israel (as it had had under Egypt) rather than forming part of Israel. The real problem was that of the West Bank.

King Hussein recognised that this war, as all wars in history, had to have consequences. Jerusalem was now a united City and must stay that way. Arrangements would have to be made for the Holy Places; King Hussein might be given a special status as custodian of the Muslim shrines. Tourist interests should be dealt with as part of some general economic arrangement. What was required was an "E.E.C.-type approach". There should be a substantial measure of economic integration between Israel and Jordan, providing for Jordanian access to the Port of Haifa; for them to benefit jointly from the resources of the Dead Sea; and for the Ports of Aqaba and Eilat also to work in close co-operation. This might seem utopian at present. But he was thinking in terms of an eventual peaceful situation.

Mr. Eban repeated that he did not know what hope there was of the Egyptians accepting the present Draft Resolution. But he understood that King Hussein regarded it as an opportunity that he himself was prepared to seize. He hoped that it could be explained to the King that acceptance of this Resolution would directly involve the United States. The King kept saying that no one but the Americans could get him a solution; so this was an excellent way of involving them in the process.

In answer to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Eban said that the French were in a bad tempered mood. Everything had gone against General de Gaulle's wishes. At present his main purpose seemed to be to ascertain the Soviet line and then follow it, or at least to oppose the

American line. De Gaulle kept seeking Four Power involvement, but Kosygin paid little attention to the General. The French were not really a factor in the situation.

The Prime Minister said that if a solution were to be found in some mixture of boundary changes with demilitarised zones, how could the demilitarisation be enforced. Mr. Eban said that this would have to be on the basis of bilateral agreements which were mutually enforceable. Israel thought little of so-called great Power guarantees. They had not been much use in June. The Prime Minister said that in June there had been no such guarantees; certainly not on a Four Power basis. Mr. Eban assented. But he commented that there had been little success in ensuring freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran. In the future arrangements must be primarily local in character, with provision for a reasonable balance of forces and for mutual enforcement of demilitarised zones. The Prime Minister expressed scepticism. Surely the past history of the area showed how impossible it was in any situation to prove which of the parties had struck first. Mr. Eban said that in that case it might be possible to have some arrangements for observers. But Israel's real guarantee lay in the possession of sufficient strength to enforce any such arrangements. The Prime Minister said that this sounded like a permanent cat-and-dog situation. Mr. Eban said that this might be so. But in practice both Israel and the Arabs were on their own, though they had to live together.

Israel had learned in June that she had to stand on her own feet. The Arabs had now learned that none of their friends were prepared forcibly to eject Israel. Both sides should learn to become less "externally orientated" and to acquire a more Middle Eastern attitude. The Arabs must accept that they could not deal indirectly with Israel. Just because ten years ago someone had been prepared to "throw us out" they had expected the same to happen this time. The war in 1956 had not been used, as wars should be, to create something lasting and stable - even though what it created had succeeded in lasting for nine years. Now Israel was determined to achieve not only peace but also a viable security arrangement to guarantee her future.

The Suez Canal

The Prime Minister asked what was to happen about the Canal. Mr. Eban said that as soon as there was a peace settlement the Canal problem would settle itself, with the assurance of freedom of passage for all nations including Israel. At that point there would be no need for Israeli troops to be stationed in Sinai. The problem of the Straits of Tiran was of course very different and much more difficult. The Prime Minister said that this did not take account of the essentially precarious nature of the Canal. At any time Egypt or Israel could prevent freedom of passage. Mr. Eban said the only answer for this was for all of us to become less dependent on the Canal. The Prime Minister agreed. Britain was already working for this. But surely it was not necessary to await

a complete settlement before the Canal could again be opened to shipping. Mr. Eban said that if agreement could be reached on non-discriminatory passage at an earlier stage this would be satisfactory. The Prime Minister said there were two problems. First to get the Canal open again; and secondly to ensure the passage of Israeli ships. Why should the former have to await agreement on the latter? Mr. Eban said the two problems were linked. Legally speaking, an opening of the Canal required simultaneous acceptance for Israeli shipping. The Prime Minister said that, apart from the legal aspect, there was a physical aspect. He assumed that Israel would not object to the Canal being cleared as soon as possible. Mr. Eban said that arrangements for clearing it would have to be concerted with the Israelis. He felt confident that agreement on this could be reached, since he could not imagine that his Government would wish to object. But the arrangements would have to be concerted under the auspices of General Bull in accordance with the ceasefire arrangements. The Prime Minister asked again whether Israel would object to the clearing. Mr. Eban said that he could see no reason why they should object. But they could not agree to freedom of passage for all vessels except those of Israel. The Prime Minister asked whether, supposing the Canal could be dredged and cleared of obstacles and if thereafter British ships began to pass through it, Israel would fire on them. Mr. Eban said that this seemed inconceivable. But their agreement with Egypt provided that there should be equality of

treatment for Israel and Egypt. It was not Israel who was obstructing the Canal. The physical obstructions had been placed there by the Egyptians and the latter also advanced the political argument that no passage could be allowed through the Canal until Israel had withdrawn militarily from it. But Israel argued that there could be no passage until Israeli ships were also allowed passage. The Prime Minister said that he did not wish to show impatience with Israel. There had been perhaps too much British impatience in the past with Nasser. But the fact was that Britain had paid an exceptionally heavy price for the closure of the Canal and many people in this country were tending to say "a plague on both your houses". The British Government had gone out on a limb at the outset in support of the principle of free passage (through the Tiran Straits.) As a result we had lost our Arab oil supplies for three months. We had been obliged to buy more expensive oil products elsewhere and to pay far higher rates for chartering tankers. As he had explained the previous week in the House of Commons, the cost to our balance of payments had been at the rate of about £20m. per month. We had been confidently anticipating a balance of payments surplus this year. This had now been lost and there was some uncertainty about the position next year. He did not suggest that these were necessarily our sole or principal concerns. But any suggestion that the Canal was remaining closed for purely protocolaire objections would arouse great concern in Britain.

Mr. Eban said that the history of past discrimination in the Canal made it understandable that Israel should seek an arrangement under which opening and freedom of passage for her shipping were simultaneous. The

Prime Minister said he understood this. But if this meant the Canal remaining closed for a further six months a very difficult situation would be created. Mr. Eban said that Israel could not accept a situation where everyone else had freedom of passage but she did not. Historically this had proved unacceptable.

The Prime Minister said that, as he understood it, the Israelis would not interfere with a dredging and clearing operation in the Canal; and they would not seek to prevent British ships then going through, if this could be achieved. There might of course be an attempt by the U.A.R. to establish some kind of link between clearing the Canal and obtaining, for example, a satisfactory settlement of the refugee problem. Mr. Eban said that the Israeli purpose was to be able to send their ships through the Canal. Their general position towards reopening was not negative, though they could certainly not accept any link between this and the refugee question. The Israeli Government could never obtain acceptance by their people of a situation under which only Israeli ships were excluded from the Canal. They would require reciprocity with Egypt. The Prime Minister asked whether this meant that 118 nations could pass their ships through the

Canal but no Egyptians ships could pass until Israeli ships did likewise. Mr. Eban agreed. This was what the Israeli-U.A.R. agreement said. The Prime Minister said that this meant that, if either Israel or Egypt were intransigent, possible progress over the Canal would be held up. Mr. Eban commented that the Egyptians had so far shown no sign of willingness to begin clearing the Canal. The Prime Minister agreed. But it would be undesirable for Egypt to be in a position of arguing that they could not clear it because Israel was preventing this. Mr. Eban said that he would look into the possibilities. Perhaps the best solution would be for ~~the matter~~ clearance of the Canal to be dealt with under U.N. auspices as on the previous occasion. They had been asked by the United Nations how they would react if all ships sailing through the Canal flew U.N. flags. They had been willing, but doubted whether the Egyptians could accept this. The Prime Minister agreed. President Nasser did not regard the Canal as international in that sense. Mr. Eban said that he did not see why Israel should object to solving the Canal problem ahead of a general settlement, provided there were strict reciprocity with Egypt. In reply to a question Mr. Eban said that Israel would insist on keeping open the Straits of Tiran. The Prime Minister said that we entirely agreed. Mr. Eban said that Nasser had displayed a fascinating psychological state of mind in speaking to the American, Mr. Anderson, about

"the conditions under which I could allow the Israelis to pass through the Straits of Tiran". Nasser seemed to be in a pre-June mentality.

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS. NEW YORK

TELNO. 5975 5 NOVEMBER 1967 (EASTERN)

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ADDRESSED TO U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 5975 OF
5 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW
AMMAN TEL AVIV AND CAIRO AND SAVING TO BEIRUT AND PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 3022 TO 3024: MIDDLE EAST.

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME THIS AFTERNOON, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM RUSK, AND URGED ME TO SUPPORT FULLY GOLDBERG'S DEMARCHE. BRUCE HAD NO DOUBT THAT RUSK WOULD NOT HAVE SENT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT KNOWING THE PRESIDENT'S MIND.
I HAVE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT I REGARD THIS TEXT AS BEING A SUBSTANTIAL MOVE ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS AND ONE THAT GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY OF COMING TOGETHER AGAIN.
2. I HAVE THEREFORE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT I AM ASKING YOU TO TELL GOLDBERG AND KING HUSSEIN THAT THIS TEXT SEEMS TO ME TO GIVE THE ARABS THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THEY WERE READY TO GO ALONG WITH IN THE AMENDED ''INDIAN'' DRAFT, WITH THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF AMERICAN SUPPORT AND AMERICAN READINESS TO URGE THE TEXT ON THE ISRAELIS. THIS BEING SO YOU SHOULD URGE HUSSEIN TO CONSIDER THE TEXT MOST SERIOUSLY AND RECOMMEND IT TO HIS FRIENDS.

3. IN ASSOCIATING MYSELF WITH THE AMERICANS IN THIS WAY I AM NOT COMMITTING MYSELF AT THIS STAGE TO CO-SPONSORSHIP OR TO TABLING THE RESOLUTION. BEFORE DECIDING ON THE NEXT STEP WE MUST KNOW THE REACTIONS OF HUSSEIN AND THE ISRAELIS. I MADE THE POINT TO BRUCE THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS MUST KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH ON THIS AND CONSULT AGAIN BEFORE ANY NEW MOVES ARE MADE BY EITHER OF US.

/4. ALTHOUGH

4. ALTHOUGH I WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT STANDS, I TOLD BRUCE THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD STAND A BETTER CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE ARABS IF THE WORD ''THEM'' WERE DELETED FROM OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3.

5. I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO DECIDE IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR TALKS WITH GOLDBERG AND HUSSEIN WHEN IT WOULD BE BEST FOR YOU TO TALK TO RIAD.

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FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 3033 5 NOVEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3033 OF 5 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW AND SAVING TO PARIS AND BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 5978: MIDDLE EAST.

I SPOKE TO KING HUSSEIN ALONE THIS AFTERNOON AND READ HIM PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 5975. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS MESSAGE AND AGREED THAT THE AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS AN IMPORTANT MOVE WHICH DESERVED SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. BUT HE MADE NO COMMENT ON WORDING. HE SAID THAT SPEED WAS ESSENTIAL AND ALL WOULD BE LOST IF WE DID NOT NOW BRING THE MATTER TO A CONCLUSION IN THE COUNCIL.

2. EARLIER IN THE DAY KUZNETZOV HAD ASKED TO SEE ME. HE STATED IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION SUITABLE FOR IMMEDIATE TABLING IN AND ADOPTION BY THE COUNCIL. A GREAT DEAL OF WORK HAD BEEN PUT INTO ITS FORMULATION BY THE SIX NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS, AND IT NOW REPRESENTED BIG CONCESSIONS BY THE ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY THE U.A.R. THE QUOTE SO-CALLED UNQUOTE DANISH DRAFT ON THE OTHER HAND WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. AS TIME PRESSED, THERE WAS NO SENSE IN TRYING FOR A THIRD DRAFT. HE THEN ASKED ME WHERE H.M.G. STOOD ON THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT WHICH SEEMED TO HIM TO INCORPORATE ALL THE PRIME MINISTER'S REQUIREMENTS ON SUBSTANCE AND BALANCE AS SET OUT IN HIS LETTER TO PREMIER KOSYGIN. HE CHALLENGED ME TO SPELL OUT WHAT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE IN IT. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE AGREED ON THE URGENCY AND, I THOUGHT, ON MOST OF THE SUBSTANCE. BUT IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG FOR THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO TIE THEMSELVES TO ONE OF TWO TEXTS ON WHICH THERE HAD BEEN SO MUCH DISAGREEMENT. SURELY HAVING COME SO FAR WE MUST BE PREPARED TO LOOK FOR NEW AND ACCEPTABLE WORDING IN ORDER TO GET THE WIDEST AGREEMENT.

/3. ADEBO

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U.K. MISSION NEW YROK TELEGRAM NO. 3033 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

3. ADEBO (NIGERIA) TOLD ME DURING THE AFTERNOON THAT THERE WAS A MOVE TO CALL THE COUNCIL VERY SOON ON THE BASIS OF THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION. I URGED ADEBO TO COUNSEL DELAY ON THOSE OF HIS FRIENDS WHO WERE BEHIND THIS MOVE. I POINTED OUT THAT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN CONSULTATIONS FOR OVER A FORTNIGHT: IT WAS NOW ESSENTIAL TO ALLOW A SHORT PERIOD FOR THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO WORK FOR THE WIDEST AGREEMENT. ADEBO AGREED AND WILL DO HIS BEST TO DISSUADE THE AFRO-ASIANS FROM PRECIPITATE ACTION.

F.O. PASS AMMAN 400, CAIRO 137, TEL AVIV 544, MOSCOW 530 AND SAVING BEIRUT 139 AND PARIS 99.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0556Z/06
RECEIVED 0605Z/06

[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 3034 5 NOVEMBER 1967
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3034 OF 5 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AMMAN CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW AND SAVING TO PARIS AND BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 5975 AND 5977 (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST.

GOLDBERG CALLED ON KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON TO SEEK HIS REACTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION SET OUT IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 3023.

2. THE KING SAID THAT HE WAS SINCERE IN SEEKING A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE BELIEVED THAT THE U.S. AND JORDAN HAD THE SAME PURPOSE AND IN THIS HE NEEDED THE HELP OF AMERICA. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WELL KNEW THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE KHARTOUM MEETING AND COULD THEREFORE BE THE BEST JUDGE OF ANY DETAILED TEXT THAT THEY MIGHT PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MANY COUNCIL MEMBERS BUT NOW HE LOOKED TOWARDS THE U.S.. HE ALSO ENCOURAGED THE AMERICANS TO SPEAK TO THE RUSSIANS.

3. GOLDBERG STRESSED THAT THE TEXT HE HAD PRESENTED TO THE KING WAS NOT A PIECE OF PAPER TO BE NEGOTIATED BUT IN FACT THE BEST OFFER HE THOUGHT COULD BE MADE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO RESTORE PEACE TO JORDAN, AND HE SPOKE OF ASSISTING JORDAN DURING THE PEACE-MAKING PERIOD.

4. THE ONLY POINT ON THE TEXT TO WHICH THE KING MADE MENTION WAS WITHDRAWAL, WISHING TO KNOW HOW AND WHEN THIS WOULD COME ABOUT.

5. AFTER THE KING HAD SEEN GOLDBERG ONE OF HIS STAFF ASKED TO SEE ME TO GIVE ME THE FOLLOWING VERBAL MESSAGE FROM THE KING. HE SAID THE KING HAD THANKED GOLDBERG FOR HIS INITIATIVE (ARISING FROM THE FIRST TALK THEY HAD HAD TOGETHER A FEW DAYS AGO). THE KING HAD GONE ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH DETAILS OF DRAFTING BUT WITH SUBSTANCE, AND MORE WITH WHAT HAPPENS ON THE GROUND BACK HOME THAN IN WORDS IN NEW YORK. HE HAD STATED THAT JORDAN WISHED PEACE AS MUCH AS ISRAEL OR ANYONE ELSE. NOW IT WAS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DECIDE EXACTLY HOW BEST TO WIN AND SECURE IT. AS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH GOLDBERG HAD SHOWN HIM THE ARABS WOULD ACCEPT ALL THE

/OBLIGATIONS

OBLIGATIONS PLACED ON THEM WITHOUT EXCEPTION. EVERY REQUIREMENT THEY WERE TO GIVE ISRAEL WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. WHAT THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT WAS THE RESTORATION OF THEIR TERRITORIES. CONSEQUENTLY THEY WANTED CLARIFICATION ON WITHDRAWAL. THE PROVISION IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WITHDRAWAL WAS OBSCURE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT DOUBT AND UNCERTAINTY ON THIS VITAL ISSUE. ADJUSTMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS ON THE BORDERS COULD BE CONSIDERED BUT GENERAL WITHDRAWAL WAS ESSENTIAL. BUT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS A JUST AND ACCEPTABLE FOUNDATION FOR REAL PEACE. THE KING HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SEEN RIAD WHO HAD AGREED IN FULL WITH WHAT THE KING HAD SAID TO GOLDBERG.

6. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THEY NOW HAVE A POSITIVE AND FORTHCOMING REACTION FROM KING HUSSEIN. THEY HAVE HOWEVER BEEN WORRIED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF RIAD (U.A.R.) WHO LAST FRIDAY HAD REVERSED HIS POSITION. UNTIL THEN THE AMERICANS FELT THAT HE HAD GONE ALONG WITH THE IDEA OF A NEW APPROACH BUT THEN HE SUDDENLY SPOKE TO THE AMERICANS ABOUT GOING QUICKLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT SAYING THAT HE WAS SEEKING CO-SPONSORS FOR THIS (AND THE AMERICANS HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT HE UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT THE CO-SPONSORSHIP OF ARGENTINA). HOWEVER IN THE KING'S MESSAGE TO ME THIS AFTERNOON, HE SAID THAT RIAD HAD QUOTE ACCEPTED UNQUOTE WHAT THE KING HAD JUST SAID TO THE AMERICANS.

7. HAVING A GOOD IDEA OF THE ISRAELI POSITION (SEE BELOW) THE AMERICANS NOW BELIEVE THAT THEY PROBABLY HAVE A TEXT WITH WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN LIVE. THEY THINK HOWEVER THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL AGREE TO BE COMMITTED TO THE TEXT PUBLICLY AND THEY ARE STILL UNCERTAIN OF FINAL ARAB REACTIONS.

8. THE AMERICANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION THEY HAD WITH KUZNETZOV WHO TOOK THE SAME TOUGH LINE WITH THEM AS HE HAD EARLIER DONE WITH ME (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 3033). THIS WAS A STERILE EXERCISE WITH KUZNETZOV INSISTING ON NEGOTIATING ON THE BASIS OF THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT AND GOLDBERG REFUSING TO DO THIS. GOLDBERG HOWEVER GAVE KUZNETZOV A COPY OF THE AMERICAN TEXT, AND IN THE END THE RUSSIANS SUGGESTED THAT THEY SHOULD MEET THE AMERICANS SOON FOR

/FURTHER

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. THEY INSISTED HOWEVER THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN SECRECY. NO DATE HAS BEEN FIXED FOR THE MEETING.

9. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHAT THE RUSSIAN GAME IS. THE RUSSIANS PROBABLY DO NOT WISH TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO HAVE A SUCCESS IN THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE BASIS OF AN AMERICAN DRAFT. ON THIS ANALYSIS THEY MAY COME UP WITH A TEXT OF THEIR OWN. ON THE OTHER HAND THEY MAY ESTIMATE THAT THEY CAN PUSH THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL (AND IN THIS CONNECTION SEE ADEBO'S APPROACH TO ME REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 3033). ALL IN ALL HOWEVER GOLDBERG IS INCLINED TO GIVE KUZNETZOV ANOTHER CHANCE TO SEE WHETHER HE WILL ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIM ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT TEXT.

10. KING HUSSEIN IS LEAVING FOR A FOUR-DAY STAY IN WASHINGTON TOMORROW AND THE AMERICANS ARE MUCH EXERCISED AS TO HOW TO REPLY TO HIS EXPECTED QUESTION ABOUT THE METHOD AND TIMING OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AS TO THE ISRAELIS, THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT TEL AVIV CAN LIVE WITH THE PRESENT TEXT THOUGH IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CREATE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE ISRAELI CABINET. THEY DO NOT THINK THAT THEY CAN MOVE THE ISRAELIS ANY FURTHER AND CONCLUDE, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF GETTING ISRAEL'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE REMOVAL OF THE WORD QUOTE THEM UNQUOTE FROM OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE AMERICAN TEXT (PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 5975 REFERS). ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS WILL BE REPORTING TODAY'S ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS TO THE ISRAELIS, THEY SAY THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO GIVE THEM THE DETAIL DESCRIBED IN THIS TELEGRAM NOR DO MORE THAN TOUCH ON THEIR DIFFICULT CONVERSATION WITH KUZNETZOV.
F.O. PASS AMMAN 401, CAIRO 138, TEL AVIV 545, MOSCOW 531 AND SAVING PARIS 100 AND BEIRUT 140.

LORD CARADON

[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 3035 5 NOVEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3035 OF 5 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW AND SAVING TO PARIS AND BEIRUT.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: MIDDLE EAST.

WITH REFERENCE TO MY TWO REPORTS ON TODAYS DEVELOPMENTS (MY TELEGRAMS NOS. 3033 AND 3034), MOST IMPORTANT IS THE FORTHCOMING MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN (PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 3034).

2. I CAN ONLY CONCLUDE FROM THIS THAT HUSSEIN, AND (ACCORDING TO HIS MESSAGE) RIAD TOO, ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOMETHING VERY LIKE THE NEW AMERICAN TEXT. THEY SEEK ASSURANCES THAT AMERICAN AND OTHER SUPPORT WILL BE SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN TO ENSURE THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN FACT TAKES PLACE.

3. BUT SOVIET, INDIAN AND MORE EXTREME ARAB PRESSURE MAY WRECK THIS NEW AND PROMISING SITUATION, AND WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION THAT RIAD AGREES WITH WHAT HUSSEIN SAID.

4. WE JUDGE HOWEVER THAT KUZNETZOV WANTS AN AGREEMENT AND MUCH WILL THEREFORE DEPEND ON THE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN HIM AND GOLDBERG.

5. AS TO THE TALKS WITH EBAN IN LONDON, SHOULD HE NOT BE TOLD THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME WE SEE IN NEW YORK A REALLY PROMISING DEVELOPMENT (I DO NOT SUGGEST THAT HE SHOULD BE TOLD ALL THAT HUSSEIN HAS SAID), AND THAT WE RELY ON HIM TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN THE COMING CRITICAL DAYS TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

F.O. PASS AMMAN 402, CAIRO 139, TEL AVIV 546, MOSCOW 532 AND SAVING PARIS 101 AND BEIRUT 141.

LORD CARADON

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3043

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
6 NOVEMBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 3043 OF 6 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO PARIS AND BEIRUT.

MY TELNO. 3035: MIDDLE EAST.
THIS MORNING I SAW BERARD (FRANCE) AND PUT IT TO HIM THAT THE AMERICAN TEXT (WHICH HE SAID HE HAD NOT YET SEEN) SEEMED TO US TO REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT MOVE AND MERITED THE MOST CAREFUL AND URGENT CONSIDERATION. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD INDEED CONSIDER IT AT ONCE.
2. SUBSEQUENTLY I SAW ADEBO (NIGERIA) WHO SAID THAT PRESSURE FOR GOING TO THE COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT WAS STILL BEING MAINTAINED AND HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DELAY IN CONSIDERING THE NEW AMERICAN TEXT. HE SAW THE VALUE AND IMPORTANCE OF GETTING AMERICAN SUPPORT, SO THAT THE AMERICANS COULD SUBSEQUENTLY INSIST ON ACTION BY ISRAEL.
3. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) THEN SPOKE TO ME, HIS MAIN PURPOSE BEING TO EMPHASISE THAT FOLLOWING THE NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE VERY EARLY ACTION WAS NECESSARY IN THE HOPE OF GOING TO THE COUNCIL VERY SOON.
4. THIS AFTERNOON RIAD (U.A.R.) ASKED TO SEE ME AND HE SPOKE AT GREAT LENGTH IN A DEPRESSED AND CONFUSED WAY.
5. HIS FIRST POINT WAS THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE SHOULD NOT GO FORWARD TO CONSIDER THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT IN THE COUNCIL. BUT THEN HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE MIGHT FAIL IN THE COUNCIL NOW. EVEN IF WE DID THERE WOULD BE VALUE TO THE ARABS IN THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT BEING PUT FORWARD (BECAUSE ITS PROVISIONS ON WITHDRAWAL WERE EXPLICIT AND WOULD BE PUT ON RECORD). THEN SUBSEQUENTLY THE COUNCIL MIGHT MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT.

/6.

6. ON THIS I SAID THAT I REMAINED STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT URGENT ACTION WAS REQUIRED IN THE COUNCIL AND THAT THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY OF AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE LOST.

7. THEN RIAD WENT ON TO SAY IN EFFECT MUCH THE SAME AS KING HUSSAIN HAD SAID YESTERDAY (SEE MY TELNO. 3034) NAMELY THAT THE ARABS WERE NOT WORRYING NOW ABOUT THE COMMITMENTS REQUIRED OF THEM. THEY WERE CONCERNED PREDOMINANTLY WITH THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL.

8. I SAID THAT THE INCLUSION IN THE NEW AMERICAN TEXT OF PROVISION FOR ''WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES'', TOGETHER WITH THE FACT THAT THIS WAS INCLUDED IN THE OPERATIVE SECTION OF THE RESOLUTION, SEEMED TO ME MOST IMPORTANT. BUT RIAD THEN EXPLAINED AT LENGTH WHY CLARIFICATION REGARDING WITHDRAWAL WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE ARABS. THEY WERE WORRIED NOT ONLY ABOUT THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION BUT ALSO ABOUT AMERICAN INTENTIONS. INDEED IF THEY HAD A WORD OF HONOUR FROM THE PRESIDENT, THAT WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH FOR THEM AND THEY WOULD NO LONGER WORRY ABOUT THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION, OR ABOUT HAVING A RESOLUTION AT ALL. WHAT THEY FEARED WAS THAT THE WORDING OF THE AMERICAN TEXT ON WITHDRAWAL AS IT NOW STANDS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO CLOUD OR AVOID THE ISSUE, AND IN PARTICULAR TO EXCLUDE GAZA AND JERUSALEM. THIS SUSPICION IS BASED ON REMARKS MADE BY THE AMERICANS (AND POSSIBLY BY THE ISRAELIS TOO) IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS AND STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT GAZA AND JERUSALEM AND EVEN THE WEST BANK WERE ''OCCUPIED'' BY THE ARABS.

9. ON THIS I SAID THAT I GATHERED THAT RIAD'S POSITION WAS THE SAME AS THAT DESCRIBED TO ME YESTERDAY BY KING HUSSAIN WHICH COULD BE SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE ARABS ACCEPTED THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE IMPOSED ON THEM, BUT COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH ANYTHING LIKE THE AMERICAN TEXT UNTIL AND UNLESS THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL WERE CLARIFIED.

/10.

10. I THEN SPOKE TO GOLDBERG AND TOLD HIM ROUGHLY WHAT RIAD HAD SAID. I ASK HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT WE COULD PUT BACK THE WORDS ''IN THE RECENT CONFLICT'' AFTER ''WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES''. GOLDBERG SAID THAT WE MUST THINK VERY CAREFULLY ABOUT WHAT KING HUSSAIN AND RIAD HAD SAID ON THIS ISSUE, NOT FORGETTING THAT WE MUST NOT LOSE ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE. MAYBE SOME ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. BUT THE NARROWING DOWN AND ELIMINATING OF OTHER DIFFERENCES SEEMED TO BE MAKING PROGRESS, AND HE WOULD SPEAK TO ME AGAIN WHEN HE HAD THOUGHT OVER WHAT I HAD SAID TO HIM.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 534, AMMAN 404, CAIRO 141, TEL AVIV 548 AND SAVING TO PARIS 103 AND BEIRUT 143.
LORD CARADON.

RMC

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Extract from

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF TURKEY, HELD AT NUMBER 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY, 6 NOVEMBER AT NOON

5. President Sunay then spoke about the Middle East. Turkey had been watching the situation very closely since the Arab/Israel war in June. Not only was Turkey closely concerned with the region of the Middle East for geographical reasons but Turkish security would be endangered if tensions in the area grew and peace was again upset. Besides, if the present extreme instability of the region continued relations between the West and the countries of the region would deteriorate, which would help the Soviet Government in their aims. Turkey had therefore been attaching great significance in recent years to her relations with Middle Eastern countries. A solution to the Middle East problem was necessary and would be helpful to world peace. But the situation was getting worse from day to day. The attitude of Israel was uncompromising and her policies were based on force. She seemed determined to resort to retaliation at every opportunity. This could be harmful to her long-term interests. Turkish contacts with the Arab

/leaders

Full copy on Turkey December 1966.

32855 Ed (4200)

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leaders, during the King of Jordan's recent visit to Turkey and the Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Iraq, and during the Turkish Foreign Minister's visit to New York in September, had left the Turkish Government with the impression that the Arab leaders today were much more moderate than in the past. This factor made the Turks feel justified in refusing to accept the uncompromising attitude of Israel.

7. President Sunay expressed fears about a new crisis in the Middle East. The Arabs were rapidly re-arming themselves or being armed. It was high time to achieve a just peace through elimination of the factors which had caused the last war, and the Great Powers and others interested should spare no effort in this direction. But an imposed solution could not succeed. One acceptable to both parties must be found. It was good that Britain had been showing more understanding towards the Arab countries recently. If the Western countries seemed opposed to, or uninterested in, the Arab position this would have a bad effect.

8. Turning to Cyprus, President Sunay said that the meeting in September between the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers had been helpful in enabling each government to learn the views of the other at a high level. The Turkish Government sincerely desired a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, in accordance with the

/principles

32855 Ed (4200)

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principles which they had stated previously. But the Greek Government seemed uncompromising on their insistence on Enosis. In fact the agreements still in force precluded both the proposals for Enosis which the Greek Government had previously advanced and those for partition which the Turkish Government had advanced. After going on to say that he saw no future in the idea of a solution imposed by the "victory" of one side over the other, President Sunay observed that Turkey's interest in a peaceful solution and her willingness to talk did not mean that her patience would be endless. Provocations, efforts to create faits accomplis and inhuman pressures all created difficulties for Turkey. President Sunay then said that any government which trampled on its own constitution stood condemned, and that he thought that Turkey and Britain both considered that the relevant international agreements were still in full force.

9. Mr. Wilson thanked President Sunay for his exposition. The way in which he had spoken, like the State Visit itself (which was by common consent a great success) had underlined the close ties between Britain and Turkey and the wide areas of common interest. We were allies in CENTO as well as in NATO. Mr. Wilson had welcomed the President's expression of loyalty to NATO and agreed with him that the need to keep

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d. 32855 Ed (4200)

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the alliance strong was as great as ever.

Mr. Wilson also said that he had been encouraged by President Gunay's remarks about the Turkish attitude to the European Economic Community, which we shared.

10. Mr. Wilson said that the gravest problem which we faced together was that of the Middle East. We had a common interest in bringing about a peaceful and early solution. And it must be a comprehensive solution capable of removing the causes of tension, not just patching things up temporarily. The danger of renewed fighting had been gravely underlined two weeks ago when the Israeli destroyer was sunk and the U.A.R. refinery set on fire. Unless progress was made quickly, attitudes in the Middle East would harden and new resentments would build up.

11. Recalling that he and Mr. Brown had had talks with King Hussein only a few days previously, Mr. Wilson said that he agreed that more moderation and restraint was being shown by the significant leaders of the Arab countries. But some were still taking an uncompromising line. One of the most important recent developments had undoubtedly been the attitude adopted by President Nasser at the Khartoum Conference and the clear indications that some of the leading Arab countries, notably the U.A.R. and Jordan, might agree to a balanced Security Council Resolution on the Middle East, not very far removed from that tentatively agreed by the

/Russians

. 32855 Ed (4200)

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Russians and the Americans at the end of the Special Session of the General Assembly. There was a clear change from the Arab attitude towards this in July. Arab acquiescence in such a Resolution would mean that they were accepting the right of Israel to live in peace and security. Mr. Wilson went on to say that moderation had carried the day at Khartoum only on the basis that early results could be expected. If these were not obtained there would be a return to extremism with all its attendant dangers. We were urging in New York the need for quick agreement in the Security Council on the basis of a balanced Resolution. An Israeli withdrawal would be balanced by a real acknowledgment on the part of the Arabs of the right of Israel to live in peace and security. If such a resolution were to be more than a mere declaration and were to constitute a means of reaching a settlement we thought it essential that a Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations should proceed to the Middle East at the earliest possible moment.

12. Mr. Wilson mentioned the desirability of an early re-opening of the Suez Canal and said that any permanent settlement should include the right of all nations to pass through the Canal, and a settlement of the refugee problem. Mr. Wilson added that there were problems of oil supplies still to be settled, involving the attitude of

/Syria

32855 Ed (4200)

MARGIN

Syria and Iraq.

13. Concluding his remarks on the Middle East, Mr. Wilson said that he hoped that the general stability of the area would be helped by the recent decision which Mr. Brown had announced on Aden. This matter had long poisoned relations between Britain and the U.A.R. but Mr. Brown would be able to tell Mr. Caglayangil later something about the prospect of a resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries following the visit of Sir Harold Beeley to Cairo.

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 3074 7 NOVEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3074 OF 7 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON TEL AVIV MOSCOW AMMAN CAIRO AND SAVING TO PARIS AND BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 3061: MIDDLE EAST.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL IS CONSULTING THE MEMBERS WITH A VIEW TO A MEETING ON THURSDAY, 9 NOVEMBER (POSSIBLY IN THE AFTERNOON).

2. MALI, NIGERIA AND INDIA HAVE SPONSORED AND CIRCULATED THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT (MY TELEGRAM NO. 3075). THE AMERICANS HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY CIRCULATED THEIR TEXT (MY TELEGRAM NO. 3076). WE ALSO HEAR THAT THE JAPANESE ARE PREPARING ANOTHER TEXT.

3. THE AMERICANS ASKED US IF WE WOULD CO-SPONSOR THEIR TEXT, BUT WE SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THAT WE COULD DO BETTER BY MAINTAINING FREEDOM OF ACTION. WHEN THE COUNCIL MEETS THE U.A.R., INDIA AND THE U.S.S.R. ARE DOWN TO SPEAK IN THAT ORDER. WE HAVE TENTATIVELY PUT OURSELVES DOWN TO SPEAK NEXT BUT WE CAN WITHDRAW AND SPEAK LATER IF WE WISH.

4. WE SHALL REPORT LATER ON HOW WE EXPECT THE MEETING TO GO AND WHAT THE VOTING MAY BE. I THINK THAT THERE MAY WELL BE ENDEAVOURS TO SECURE LAST MINUTE AGREEMENT. IT MUST BE OBVIOUS TO THE ARABS THAT A VICTORY ON THE VOTING IS NOT GOING TO PRODUCE RESULTS ON THE GROUND UNLESS AMERICAN SUPPORT AND ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE CAN BE WON.

5. WE THINK THAT IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME FORWARD AT THE LAST MOMENT WITH A DRAFT WHICH MIGHT BE SUPPORTED IF DEADLOCK ON OTHER TEXTS HAD BEEN REACHED, AND IN THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH NOW EXIST WE HAVE HAD ANOTHER SHOT AT A COMPROMISE DRAFT TO REPLACE THE ONE SENT TO YOU IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 3026. THIS REVISED DRAFT IS SET OUT IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 3077 AND DETAILED COMMENTS ON IT ARE IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 3078.

/ 6.

WE ARE ANXIOUS TO GET YOUR GUIDANCE ON THIS REVISED TEXT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE (IT IS OF COURSE IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO TALK YET OF A BRITISH TEXT).

F.O. PASS TEL AVIV 550, MOSCOW 537, AMMAN 406, CAIRO 143 AND SAVING PARIS 107 AND BEIRUT 145.

LORD CARADON

[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

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RFI TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, AMMAN, CAIRO AND
SAVING TO PARIS AND BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 3074: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED BY INDIA, MALI AND NIGERIA TODAY:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

EXPRESSING ITS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 233 (1967) OF 6 JUNE 1967 ON THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING WHICH CALLED FOR, AS A FIRST STEP, AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR A CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA,

RECALLING FURTHER GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2256 (ES-V),

EMPHASIZING THE URGENCY OF REDUCING TENSIONS, RESTORING PEACE AND BRINGING ABOUT NORMALCY IN THE AREA,

1. AFFIRMS THAT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

(1) OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY MILITARY CONQUEST IS INADMISSABLE UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CONFLICT.

(11) LIKEWISE, EVERY STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND COMPLETE SECURITY FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF WAR AND CONSEQUENTLY ALL STATES IN THE AREA SHOULD TERMINATE THE STATE OR CLAIM OF BELLIGERENCY AND SETTLE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

/ (111)

(111) LIKEWISE, EVERY STATE OF THE AREA HAS THE RIGHT TO BE SECURE WITHIN ITS BORDERS AND IT IS OBLIGATORY ON ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE AREA TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ONE ANOTHER.

2. AFFIRMS FURTHER:

(1) THERE SHOULD BE A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE REFUGEES.

(11) THERE SHOULD BE GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA.

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESPATCH A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA WHO WOULD CONTACT THE STATES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO COORDINATE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF THIS RESOLUTION AND TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WITHIN 30 DAYS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS TO TEL AVIV 551, MOSCOW 538, AMMAN 407, CAIRO 144 AND SAVING TO PARIS 108 AND BEIRUT 146.

LORD CARADON

HH

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 3077 7 NOVEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3077 OF 7 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 3074: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF OUR OWN REVISED DRAFT:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

(1) EXPRESSING ITS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

(2) EMPHASISING THE URGENCY OF REDUCING TENSIONS, RESTORING PEACE AND BRINGING ABOUT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN WHICH EVERY STATE IN THE AREA CAN LIVE IN SECURITY,

(3) EMPHASISING FURTHER THAT ALL MEMBER STATES IN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A COMMITMENT TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER,

1. AFFIRMS THAT THE FULFILMENT OF THE ABOVE CHARTER PRINCIPLES REQUIRES THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A STATE OF JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

   (I) WITHDRAWAL OF ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT,

   (II) TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY, AND RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA, AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE FRONTIERS FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE:

2. AFFIRMS FURTHER THE NECESSITY

   (A) FOR GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA:

   (B) FOR ACHIEVING A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM:

/ (C)

(C) FOR GUARANTEEING THE TERRITORIAL INVIOLABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA, THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARISED ZONES:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PROCEED TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THE STATES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN THIS RESOLUTION:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ENDS

LORD CARADON

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 3078 7 NOVEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3078 OF 7 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 3077: MIDDLE EAST.

IN PREPARING OUR NEW DRAFT WE HAVE TAKEN AS OUR STARTING POINT THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 4 OF THE NEW AMERICAN DRAFT (MY TELEGRAM NO. 3076) (LESS PARAGRAPH 2(D)). WE HAVE, HOWEVER, MADE SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES:

A) TO ENSURE THAT OUR NEW DRAFT CANNOT BE CLAIMED AS SIMPLY THE AMERICAN DRAFT IN A DIFFERENT GUISE.

B) TO SEPARATE OUT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION AND TO MAKE IT MORE SPECIFIC BY ADDING THE WORDS QUOTE OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT UNQUOTE: WE THINK THAT THESE CHANGES ARE ESSENTIAL TO ATTRACT THE ARABS.

C) TO SET OUT IN A SEPARATE SUB-PARAGRAPH (II) ALL THE OTHER BALANCING ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT (RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCE, ETC) BUT EXCLUDING THE SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO QUOTE MUTUAL RECOGNITION UNQUOTE AND QUOTE RECOGNISED UNQUOTE FRONTIERS TO WHICH THE ARABS OBJECT. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO BALANCE THESE OMISSIONS BY CALLING FOR QUOTE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF UNQUOTE AS WELL AS QUOTE RESPECT FOR UNQUOTE THE VARIOUS WIDER RIGHTS ENUMERATED IN SUB-PARAGRAPH (II) OF OUR NEW DRAFT.

D) IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 WE HAVE TRIED A NEW FORMULATION OF THE MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE ARAB AND ISRAELI POSITIONS.

2. WE ARE, OF COURSE, SOME WAY FROM THE TIME WHEN A MIDDLE OF THE ROAD TEXT OF THIS TYPE COULD BE TABLED. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BOTH SIDES WOULD PROBABLY REFUSE TO RECEIVE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON THE BASIS OF OUR TEXT. BUT THEIR ATTITUDES MIGHT CHANGE IF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COUNCIL BRING US TO THE POINT WHERE BOTH SIDES CAN SEE THAT TO PRESS THEIR OWN PREFERRED DRAFTS WOULD HAVE NO RESULT. A THIRD AND REASONABLY IMPARTIAL TEXT COULD THEN BECOME A RUNNER.

3. IF THE TIME COMES TO PUT ONE DOWN WE SHOULD NEED TO MOVE VERY QUICKLY AND I SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR URGENT COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT.

LORD CARADON

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Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Belgian Foreign Minister at the Foreign Office 14th Nov. '67 (Extract).

Middle East

13. M. Harmel said that he wished to hear what Mr. Brown could tell him on this subject. Mr. Brown said that he had not much to say that M. Harmel did not already know. The scene was in New York. His fear was that if we did not get a decision from the Security Council very soon on the basis of which a special representative of the Secretary-General could go to the area and get Israel and the Arabs together then a number of things would change. Some moderate Arab regimes would disappear. He did not know whether M.Harmel might regard President Nasser's regime as moderate but it was at any rate better than in the past. King Hussein's regime in Jordan was also unstable and if too much time went by both these regimes might go and the spirit of Khartoum would pass. He did not think that either would be replaced by more moderate regimes. A quick decision was therefore needed.

14. Mr. Brown added that he had a double problem. There were two resolutions before the Council for either of which he could authorise the United Kingdom vote to be cast. But both were unacceptable to one side or the other. The Council was stuck there for the moment. Until we could find a way out, whether by somebody bringing forward a new resolution, or by amending either of the existing resolutions or persuading the United States and the USSR to move back to the position which they had earlier agreed the Council was likely to remain in that difficulty. He was therefore working on the problem of whether to seek progress through a new resolution or via amendments. This was the immediate problem. Once it had been got out of the way we would then get movement on other aspects of the problem. As regards our own affairs, these were improving. We would be back in relations with the UAR soon and with the others who had broken off relations at the same time fairly soon after that. We would thus be in a position to exert rather more influence. Sir D. Allen added that, in our view, a Security Council resolution must have practical effects on the ground if it was to be of value.

15. Mr. Harmel considered that this was an extremely clear analysis. He agreed that action was for New York and in the Security Council, and that the objective was to secure the appointment of a Special Representative. If we did not get this it would be bad for the repute of the Security Council. There were few people who saw this problem clearly. He thought it was time for those who did to take a hand in the matter.

Top Copy on Foreign Policy (EEC + EFTA) Jul '65 67

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TOP SECRET

TRINE GAMMA

PRIME MINISTER

Minute by M.J. Burke 3/11/67

(Returned by Sir B. Trend)

Reference the attached papers; like Burke I am not wholly convinced by the J.I.C. minute. Spanish Report and Russian Series.

I do not quarrel with the substance of paragraph 2 of Butler's minute. But equally it seems to me that he takes it all too literally. The Spanish Ambassador's comment in the last paragraph still strikes me as quite perceptive. The Russians do badly need to open the Canal; and they may well foresee a situation in which the only way to do this could seem to be by creating such a serious new crisis as to get really affective pressure brought to bear by the Americans and ourselves on Israel to permit the opening. Of course this would be brinkmanship and potentially very dangerous. But we all know that there are various trends of thinking evident in Moscow about handling the Middle East situation; and which of us can say that, if the current relatively moderate line pursued by the Soviet Government does not produce results, the Moscow "hawks" will not insist on their trying tougher measures? Whether or not the Russians would link such a renewed Middle Eastern crisis directly with Vietnam (as suggested by the Spaniard) seems to me more doubtful - though in certain circumstances I think it would be unwise to exclude it as a possibility.

Finally, a detail. I dare say the Spanish Ambassador is not a military expert. But equally Mr. Butler is slightly misrepresenting him. He never said that the U.A.R. Air Force "could give air cover" from bases in Algeria and the Sudan. But simply that it would locate its air force bases there "in order to prevent a recurrence of the destruction suffered in the last war". The distances are of course enormous. But I think one should not exclude the possibility of the U.A.R. situating bomber bases and other valuable equipment in neighbouring Arab countries - which is after all only what the Spaniard is suggesting.

All in all therefore I think we should continue to bear this possibility in mind.

November 8, 1967.

Foreign Office
S.W.1

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Prime Minister

To see, with

16 November, 1967

Dear Michael, yesterday's note.

Later today Lord Caradon may be tabling in the Security Council a draft resolution on the Middle East crisis.

As you know we have consistently taken the line that the Security Council should pass a balanced resolution calling on the Arabs, in exchange for Israeli withdrawal, to give up their claims to belligerency. Any resolution, in our view, should also appoint a representative of the Secretary General to go to the area.

The present position is that there are two resolutions on the table - an American text and an Afro-Asian text - and others being canvassed in the corridors. None of these is acceptable to both the Arabs and the Israelis. In his discussions in New York Lord Caradon has pointed to the futility of passing a resolution which would have no practical effect on the ground. At the present stage it is still not possible to say whether the Security Council will collectively come to its senses and agree to a generally acceptable text. But the point may have been reached when we must make our own position clear or let it go by default.

... I enclose a text of the resolution which Lord Caradon is being instructed to table when he judges the right moment has come. Our main object in tabling it is to put on the record a clear statement of our position. This will be defended on the grounds that it represents what we have consistently advocated and what we think should be acceptable to both the Arabs and the Israelis.

Yours ever,

Donald

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

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PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister.

Re Middle East.

Re short note for which you asked.

Not very encouraging.

No main news.

Telegrams on in the folder.

RN

15/11

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NOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

MIDDLE EAST - SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council has resumed its debate on the Middle East: it is meeting this afternoon for the third time and is likely to adjourn for further consultations. There are two draft resolutions before the Council tabled by the United States, and by India, Mali and Nigeria. The Latin American members are expected to table today a draft resolution closely following the Latin American text voted on at the Emergency Session. The Israelis have said that they will not accept the Afro-Asian or Latin American drafts, or co-operate with any arrangements made under them: the Americans would probably support them in this. The Arabs state that the Afro-Asian draft embodies very considerable concessions on their part, and represents the furthest limit to which they can go to meet the Israel point of view. The Arabs are pressing hard for early action. The present indications are that the United States and three-power draft resolutions would fail for lack of support but that the Latin American draft might attract sufficient votes.

2. All three drafts aim to set out in a balanced way the principles on which a settlement should be based, and to provide for the appointment of a representative of the Secretary-General to go to the Middle East to work towards a settlement on the basis of the principles laid down in the resolution. The main difference between them centres on the formulation of the principle of Israeli withdrawal and on whether the Secretary-General's representative should

/try

try to promote a settlement or should, as the Israelis would like, confine himself to assisting the parties concerned to reach a settlement.

3. We regard it as essential that the resolution the Security Council passes should be acceptable to both sides as a basis for making progress towards a settlement. We have no difficulties over the wording of any of the three draft resolutions. But they all suffer from the crucial defect that they are unacceptable to one side or the other and the passage of any one of them would therefore not lead to progress on the ground.

4. Lord Caradon has drafted a compromise resolution which he will table at the appropriate moment: this may come in the next day or two. The purpose is:

(a) at best to attract sufficient support for it to be adopted where other drafts fail; and

(b) in any case to explain and protect our own position in the event of the other resolutions coming to the vote: we expect to abstain on them on the grounds that they would be unproductive.

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

15 November, 1967.

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EN CLAIR
FLASH U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 3249 16 NOVEMBER 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3249 OF 16 NOVEMBER. REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, TOKYO, COPENHAGEN, LAGOS, DELHI, SOFIA, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JEDDA, AMMAN, KUWAIT, RABAT, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, ADDIS ABABA, BAHRAIN, TEHRAN, RAWALPINDI, ANKARA, AND U K DEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BRITISH DRAFT RESOLUTION AS TABLED AND INTRODUCED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

(1) EXPRESSING ITS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

(2) EMPHASISING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR AND THE NEED TO WORK FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN WHICH EVERY STATE IN THE AREA CAN LIVE IN SECURITY,

(3) EMPHASISING FURTHER THAT ALL MEMBER STATES IN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A COMMITMENT TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER,

1. AFFIRMS THAT THE FULFILMENT OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES REQUIRES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE APPLICATION OF BOTH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES

(I) WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT:

(II) TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE:

/2.

2. AFFIRMS FURTHER THE NECESSITY
(A) FOR GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA:
(B) FOR ACHIEVING A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM:
(C) FOR GUARANTEEING THE TERRITORIAL INVIOLABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA, THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES:
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PROCEED TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THE STATES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN THIS RESOLUTION:
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
ENDS
F O PASS FLASH TO BUENOS AIRES 84 AND FLASH TO RIO DE JANEIRO 59 IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 583, PARIS 591, TOKYO 43, COPENHAGEN 136, LAGOS 15, NEW DELHI 71, SOFIA 8, TEL AVIV 592, CAIRO 188, BEIRUT 192, JEDDA 102, AMMAN 447, KUWAIT 26, RABAT 16, TUNIS 30, TRIPOLI 11, KHARTOUM 19, ADDIS ABABA 49, BAHRAIN 21, TEHRAN 38, RAWALPINDI 10, ANKARA 86, AND UKDEL NATO 30.
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F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 6391 17 NOVEMBER 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 6391 OF 17 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, RIO DE JANIERO, BUENOS AIRES AND SAVING TO PARIS AND BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAMS 3252 AND 3253 (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST.

I ADMIRE THE SKILFUL WAY IN WHICH YOU HAVE MADE THE MOST OF OUR TACTICAL POSITION AND I OF COURSE WISH TO LEAVE THIS IN YOUR HANDS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT HERE TO THE SITUATION NOW REACHED AND I HOPE THAT OUR IDEAS MAY BE HELPFUL TO YOU.

2. OUR OBJECTIVES REMAIN TO REACH AN EFFECTIVE AGREED RESOLUTION IF THIS IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE AND, IN ANY CASE, TO DEFEND AND JUSTIFY OUR OWN POSITION ON THE BASIS OF OUR OWN RESOLUTION.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF VOTES WHICH MAY ARISE. WE OF COURSE HOPE THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION WILL NOT BE TABLED. IN THAT CASE, YOU WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE 3-POWER AND U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND VOTE FOR OUR OWN. THE POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS REFERRED TO IN YOUR TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE CREATE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES. QUOTE ALL THE UNQUOTE WOULD BE SEEN AS A CLEAR REFERENCE TO JERUSALEM. QUOTE THE UNQUOTE IS PERHAPS NOT QUITE SO OPEN TO THE SAME CONSTRUCTION. THE IDEAL SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR THE ARABS NOT TO PROPOSE EITHER AMENDMENT AND YOU SHOULD STRESS TO THEM THAT BY DOING SO THEY WOULD WRECK OUR HOPE OF ISRAELI ACQUIESENCE. IF THEY NEVERTHELESS PERSIST COULD YOU SUGGEST TO THE JORDANIANS THAT THEY PRESS THE EGYPTIANS NOT TO PUT FORWARD QUOTE ALL THE UNQUOTE? IN RETURN I SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT QUOTE THE UNQUOTE, I.E. TO ACCEPT THE AMENDMENT PROPOSING IT, IF THIS IS THE ONLY WAY OF PREVENTING AN AMENDMENT FOR QUOTE ALL THE UNQUOTE. IF, DESPITE ALL YOU CAN DO, QUOTE ALL THE UNQUOTE IS PROPOSED, YOU SHOULD ABSTAIN ON THE AMENDMENT AND VOTE FOR THE AMENDED RESOLUTION WITH AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON THE LINES OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW.

/ 4. I HOPE

4. I NOTE THAT YOU DO NOT ASK AT PRESENT FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE OTHER POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS MOOTED IN YOUR SECOND TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. I WOULD NOT FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT THE DELETION OF THE REFERENCE TO DEMILITARISED ZONES, OR THE SPECIFICATION OF A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD REPORT, OR THE INCLUSION OF A SUITABLE REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS U.N. RESOLUTIONS. BUT THE AMENDMENTS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 1(B) AND (D) WOULD REMOVE ANY ATTRACTION IN THE RESOLUTION FOR THE ISRAELIS AND CONSEQUENTLY ITS PECULIAR VALUE. I WOULD AT THIS STAGE BE RELUCTANT TO OPEN THE DRAFT TO AMENDMENT IN ANY DIRECTION EXCEPT BY VOTE OF THE COUNCIL.

5. IF THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION IS TABLED, YOU WILL NO DOUBT PRESS HARD TO HAVE OURS PUT TO THE VOTE FIRST, GIVEN THE EXPECTATION THAT THEIRS WOULD CARRY. IF, DESPITE OUR EFFORTS, THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION CAME TO THE FIRST VOTE, WE SHOULD ABSTAIN ON IT. (HAVING ABSTAINED ON THE MOTION FOR PRIORITY), EXPLAINING OUR ACTION BY REFERENCE TO OUR OWN DRAFT RESOLUTION. BUT IF OURS IS VOTED ON FIRST AND FAILS, I WOULD THEN SEE OVERRIDING MERIT IN VOTING IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT. YOU WOULD EXPLAIN YOUR VOTE ON THE GROUNDS THAT AFTER ALL OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE A COMPROMISE HAD FAILED, WE THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO VOTE FOR THE REMAINING RESOLUTION SINCE WE THOUGHT THAT, AFTER ALL THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST PASS A RESOLUTION ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER WHICH COMES SO FIRMLY WITHIN ITS RESPONSIBILITY.

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IMMEDIATE RIO DE JANEIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 561 17 November 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 561 of 17 November. Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington and Buenos Aires.

My immediately preceding telegram: Middle East.

There has been a further development here this afternoon, on the American side.

2. Ambassador Goldberg telephoned from New York, on President Johnson's authority, instructing the U.S. Ambassador to return to the attack with the Brazilian Foreign Minister to convince him that the United Kingdom draft resolution had the only hope of success and that the Brazilians must help by dropping their own resplution.

3. This renewed American insistence elicited the same reaction as I have already reported. The Brazilian Foreign Minister said that his Government had gone too far and could not now withdraw without generally losing face and, specifically, forfeiting the credit which Brazil had recently gained with the Arab States by her good offices.

4. They therefore must table their resolution. They would however not insist on its exclusive merits: all the resolutions should be tabled: a useful distillation could then be achieved - with credit all round.

5. These American tactics are now only annoying the Brazilians. They have not, I think, yet told the Americans (or the Israelis) of their suggestion to us for a tripartite Brazil/Argentine/United Kingdom working party and draft. I am accordingly not mentioning it here either: It is probably best to let the Americans and Israelis learn of this in New York first.

6. In fact the Brazilian attitude has evolved in quite a reasonable and constructive manner from their first rather superficial approach; and I think they are now genuinely looking for workable solutions on the ground rather than paper victories in New York.

7. They are perhaps over-optimistic about the possibility of marrying their draft and ours, given certain fairly radical differences in them. But I hope that we shall be able to express appreciation to the Brazilians of their suggestion for tripartite collaboration with Argentina. Even if this comes to nothing I think it is quite a political advance to get as near as this to a resolution sponsored by us with two Latin American partners.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate New York 5 and Priority to Washington 57 and Buenos Aires 65.

Sir J. Russell [Repeated as requested]

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 3272 17 NOVEMBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 3272 OF 17 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO NEW DELHI, RIO DE JANEIRO, BUENOS AIRES AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO. 6391 (NOT TO ALL).

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY TELNO. 3270 THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADJOURNED THIS AFTERNOON AT THE REQUEST OF THE BULGARIANS AND RUSSIANS UNTIL MONDAY WITHOUT FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION. THE MAIN HURDLES REMAIN THE APPARENT DETERMINATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAS TO GO AHEAD WITH THEIR TEXT AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE INDIAN DELEGATION MAY, OUT OF MISPLACED LOYALTY TO THE ARABS, ENGAGE IN SOME OF THE PROCEDURAL MANOEUVRING TO WHICH THEY ARE PRONE HERE.

2. WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE REPRESENTATIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE, BUT IT MAY BE WORTH MAKING ANOTHER MAJOR ATTEMPT TO ENSURE THAT OUR DRAFT IS NOT FACED WITH EITHER OF THESE TWO HURDLES ON MONDAY.

3. THE MAIN LATIN DIFFICULTY IS THAT THEY HAVE PUBLICLY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PUTTING DOWN A TEXT AND ARE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO FIND A FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR NOT DOING SO: HENCE THE SUGGESTIONS WHICH HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE BY THEIR DELEGATIONS HERE THAT WE SHOULD SEEK SOMEHOW TO MELD OUR TEXT WITH THEIRS.

4. IN THE CASE OF THE INDIANS IT IS A QUESTION OF CONVINCING THEM THAT THEIR OBJECTIVES AND OURS COINCIDE: THAT THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT HAVING BEEN TURNED DOWN BY THE ISRAELIS, HAS NO CHANCE OF ACHIEVING [illegible] AND THAT OUR DRAFT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN TURNED DOWN

THAT THEIR OBJECTIVES AND OURS COINCIDE: THAT THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT HAVING BEEN TURNED DOWN BY THE ISRAELIS, HAS NO CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THESE: AND THAT OUR DRAFT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN TURNED DOWN BY EITHER SIDE OFFERS US AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH MAY NOT RECUR.

5. I SHALL MAKE MY RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE LATINS TOMORROW BUT IN THE MEANTIME YOU MAY LIKE TO CONSIDER SENDING A HIGH LEVEL MESSAGE TO THE INDIANS WHICH MIGHT BE ON THE LINES OF MY I.F.T.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO NEW DELHI 73, RIO DE JANEIRO 64, BUENOS AIRES 89.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 180114/18Z HJ

SENT AT 0124Z/18 DAW

file

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3273 17 NOVEMBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3273 OF 17 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO NEW DELHI, RIO DE JANEIRO, BUENOS AIRES, AND WASHINGTON.

M.I.P.T.

FOLLOWING IS OUTLINE OF MESSAGE TO THE INDIANS.

2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS AT A CRUCIAL STAGE IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. UNLESS THE COUNCIL CAN PASS A RESOLUTION WHICH CAN HAVE SOME HOPE OF BEING EFFECTIVE ON THE GROUND, AN OPPORTUNITY WILL PASS WHICH MIGHT NEVER RECUR. WE KNOW THE IMMENSE EFFORT WHICH THE INDIAN DELEGATION HAVE MADE TO FIND A BASIS FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION. UNFORTUNATELY, DESPITE ITS GREAT MERITS, THE DRAFT WHICH THE INDIANS, NIGERIANS AND MALIANS PROPOSED HAS BEEN REJECTED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES, AND WE THUS RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED THAT, EVEN IF PASSED, IT COULD NO LONGER HELP TO BRING ABOUT THE PEACE OF THE REGION WHICH IS SO SORELY NEEDED.

3. IT WAS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT, BASING OURSELVES ON THE WORK ALREADY DONE BY THE AFRO-ASIAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WE TOOK UP THE TASK OF PRODUCING A DRAFT. OUR OBJECTIVES WERE THE SAME - TO PROVIDE FOR THE DESPATCH OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY IN TERMS IN WHICH THE PARTIES MIGHT AT LEAST BE BROUGHT TO ACQUIESCE, EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT SPECIFICALLY ACCEPT THEM. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN WE GET THE EFFECTIVE ACTION ON THE GROUND WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL.

/ 4. WE THINK

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4. WE THINK THAT THE DRAFT WE WERE ABLE TO TABLE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE RECOGNISE ITS IMPERFECTIONS, BUT NO DRAFT COULD COMPLETELY MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE TWO SIDES.
WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT, IN SPITE OF THEIR RESERVATIONS, BOTH THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS SEEM PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN IT: AND THUS THINK THAT IT IS THE DRAFT WHICH WOULD GIVE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE THE BEST HOPE OF SUCCESS IN CARRYING OUT HIS MANDATE.
5. INDIA HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE JUNE. THEIR ROLE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS STILL A VITAL ONE. WE VERY MUCH HOPE THEREFORE THAT THEY WILL AGREE THAT OUR DRAFT SHOULD BE GIVEN A FAIR WIND AND THAT THEY WILL VOTE FOR IT. IF THEY WOULD GO FURTHER AND CONSIDER ADOPTING OUR TEXT AS A TEXT ON WHICH MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MIGHT AGREE THAT WOULD BE THE BEST OF ALL.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE TO NEW DELHI NO. 74, RIO DE JANEIRO NO. 65
AND BUENOS AIRES NO. 90.
LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Cypher/Cat A

FLASH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

Telno 2425 18 November, 1967 (Eastern)

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to New Delhi telegram No. 2425 of 18 November, Repeated for information to U.K.Mis. New York (Immediate), and to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Washington.

U.K.Mis. New York telegrams Nos. 6272 and 6273: Middle East.

Please pass message in my immediately following telegram to Mrs. Gandhi from Prime Minister as soon as possible.

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Eastern Dept.

WWWWW

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Foreign Office
S.W.1

18 November, 1967.

Dear Michael,

Message to Mrs. Gandhi: Middle East

Please refer to my letter of 16 November about the Security Council debate on the Middle East.

I now enclose a self-explanatory telegram (U.K. MIS telegram No.3272) in which Lord Caradon asks that a high level message be sent to New Delhi in support of our draft resolution in the Security Council.

I have discussed this with the Foreign Secretary who hopes that the Prime Minister will agree to send a message to Mrs. Gandhi on the lines of the second ... of the two draft telegrams attached.

I am copying this letter to Williams in the Commonwealth Office.

Yours ever,

Donald

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT EASTERN

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) .....

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And to .....

repeated for information to U.K.MIS. N.Y. -IMMEDIATE

Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Washington

Saving to .....

UKMIS N.Y. tels Nos. 6272 and 6273: Middle East.

Please pass message in m.i.f.t. to Mrs. Gandhi from Prime Minister as soon as possible.

Draft Telegram to:—
New Delhi

No. .....

(Date) .....

And to:—

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No. .....

(Date) .....

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Addressed to New Delhi

telegram No. ..... *(date)* .....

And to .....

repeated for information to/ Immediate UKMIS, N.Y. & to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Washington

Saving to .....

M.I.P.T.:Middle East.

Begins.

I am writing to you about the crucial stage which the Security Council has reached in its consideration of the Middle East crisis. Unless the Council can pass a resolution which can have some hope of being effective on the ground, an opportunity will pass which might never recur. I know the immense effort which the Indian Delegation have made to find a basis for such a resolution. Unfortunately, despite its great merits, the draft which the Indian, Nigerian, and Mali Delegations have proposed to the Council has been rejected by one of the parties. We thus reluctantly conclude that, even if passed, it could no longer help to bring about the peace which the region so sorely needs.

/2.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

2. It is in these circumstances that, basing ourselves on the work already done by the Afro-Asian and other members of the Council, we took up the task of producing a draft resolution. Our objectives were the same as yours--to provide for the despatch of a Special Representative on the basis of tne principles of withdrawal and security in terms in which the parties might at least be brought to acquiesce, even if they could not specifically accept them. Only in this way can we get the effective action on the ground which is so essential.

3. We think that the draft we were able to table this week might be acceptable for this purpose. We recognize its imperfections, but no draft could completely meet the demands of the two sides. We are encouraged that, despite their reservations, both the Arabs and the Israelis seem prepared to acquiesee in it. We thus think that it is the draft resolution which would give the Special Representative the best hope of success in carrying out his mandate.

4. India has played a key role in the consider-ation of the Middle East question since June. Y Your role in the Security Council is still a vital one. I very much hope, therefore, that you will agree that our draft should be given a fair wind and that you will instruct your Delegation to vote for it when it comes to the vote, probably on Monday, 20 November. If you can go further and consider adopting our draft resolution as a text on which members of the Council might agree, that would be best of all.

5. May I say again that we have much admired the patient and persistent efforts of the Indian Delegation to reach agreement. We wholeheartedly share this aim and think that it can be reached as I now propose.

Ends.

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No T 247/67

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

TELNO 2426 18 NOVEMBER, 1967 (EASTERN DEPT.)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO DELHI TELEGRAM NO 2426 OF 18 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES AND WASHINGTON.
M I P T: MIDDLE EAST.
BEGINS.
I AM WRITING TO YOU ABOUT THE CRUCIAL STAGE WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS REACHED IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. UNLESS THE COUNCIL CAN PASS A RESOLUTION WHICH CAN HAVE SOME HOPE OF BEING EFFECTIVE ON THE GROUND, AN OPPORTUNITY WILL PASS WHICH MIGHT NEVER RECUR. I KNOW THE IMMENSE EFFORT WHICH THE INDIAN DELEGATION HAVE MADE TO FIND A BASIS FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION. UNFORTUNATELY, DESPITE ITS GREAT MERITS, THE DRAFT WHICH THE INDIAN, NIGERIAN, AND MALI DELEGATIONS HAVE PROPOSED TO THE COUNCIL HAS BEEN REJECTED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES. WE THUS RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED THAT, EVEN IF PASSED, IT COULD NO LONGER HELP TO BRING ABOUT THE PEACE WHICH THE REGION SO SORELY NEEDS.
2. IT IS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT, BASING OURSELVES ON THE WORK ALREADY DONE BY THE AFRO-ASIAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WE TOOK UP THE TASK OF PRODUCING A DRAFT RESOLUTION. OUR OBJECTIVES WERE THE SAME AS YOURS - TO PROVIDE FOR THE DESPATCH OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY IN TERMS IN WHICH THE PARTIES MIGHT AT LEAST BE BROUGHT TO ACQUIESCE, EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT SPECIFICALLY ACCEPT THEM. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN WE GET THE EFFECTIVE ACTION ON THE GROUND WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL.

/3...

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to F.O.
C.O.
Sir B. Trew 20.11.67

3. WE THINK THAT THE DRAFT WE WERE ABLE TO TABLE THIS WEEK MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE RECOGNIZE ITS IMPERFECTIONS, BUT NO DRAFT COULD COMPLETELY MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE TWO SIDES. WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT, DESPITE THEIR RESERVATIONS, BOTH THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS SEEM PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN IT. WE THUS THINK THAT IT IS THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD GIVE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE THE BEST HOPE OF SUCCESS IN CARRYING OUT HIS MANDATE.

4. INDIA HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION SINCE JUNE. YOUR ROLE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS STILL A VITAL ONE. I VERY MUCH HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT OUR DRAFT SHOULD BE GIVEN A FAIR WIND AND THAT YOU WILL INSTRUCT YOUR DELEGATION TO VOTE FOR IT WHEN IT COMES TO THE VOTE, PROBABLY ON MONDAY, 20 NOVEMBER. IF YOU CAN GO FURTHER AND CONSIDER ADOPTING OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION AS A TEXT ON WHICH MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MIGHT AGREE, THAT WOULD BE BEST OF ALL.

5. MAY I SAY AGAIN THAT WE HAVE MUCH ADMIRED THE PATIENT AND PERSISTENT EFFORTS OF THE INDIAN DELEGATION TO REACH AGREEMENT. WE WHOLEHEARTEDLY SHARE THIS AIM AND THINK THAT IT CAN BE REACHED AS I NOW PROPOSE.

ENDS.

CROSEC

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 2313 19 November,1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to C.O. telegram No. 2313 of 19 November.

Repeated for information to: UKMis New York.

Your telegram No. 2425: Middle East.

Message was delivered this morning by Minister (Political)to Prime Minister's Private Secretary who was just leaving to see Mrs. Gandhi and said he would show it to her immediately.

C.O. pass Immediate UKMis New York No. 31.

Mr. Freeman

[Repeated as requested].

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M.E.W. and U.N. Dept.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East (War)
Pt 8

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 3305 20 NOVEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 3305 OF 20 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT.

WASHINGTON TELNO. 3667 TO F.O.: MIDDLE EAST.
TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION AS GIVEN TO ME BY KUZNETSOV, AND WHICH MAY BE TABLED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY IS AS FOLLOWS:-

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

EXPRESSING ITS CONCERN WITH THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WITH THE INCREASE OF TENSION IN THE AREA,

NOTING THAT THERE EVEN WERE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE, PRESCRIBED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTIONS 233 OF JUNE 6, 234 OF JUNE 9 AND 236 OF JUNE 12, 1967, WHICH WAS CONSIDERED AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST PEACE IN THE AREA AND HAD TO BE REINFORCED BY OTHER APPROPRIATE MEASURES,

RECALLING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2252(ES-V), 2253(ES-V), 2254(ES-V) AND 2256(ES-V),

EMPHASISING THE URGENT NECESSITY OF RESTORING PEACE AND BRINGING ABOUT NORMALCY IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

1. DECLARES THAT PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTIONS OF THIS PROBLEM CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

2. URGES (SIC) TO CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING:

A. WITHOUT DELAY WITHDRAWAL BY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT OF THEIR FORCES TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED BEFORE JUNE 5, 1967 IN KEEPING WITH THE INADMISSIBILITY OF CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR:

/B.

B. WITHOUT DELAY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE AREA THAT EACH ENJOYS THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THEREWITH:

3. CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY IN THIS CONNECTION TO CONTINUE FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLEEAST, WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND USING THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING AN APPROPRIATE AND JUST SOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM GUIDED BY:

A. USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATES IS INADMISSIBLE UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

B. EVERY STATE MUST RESPECT THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL OTHER STATES OF THE AREA:

C. THERE SHOULD BE A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE REFUGEES:

D. INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:

4. ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DIRECTION ALL STATES IN THE AREA SHOULD PUT AN END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, TAKE MEASURES TOWARDS A LIMITATION OF THE WASTEFUL AND DESTRUCTIVE ARMS RACE AND RESPECT THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 592, CAIRO 200, AMMAN 453, BEIRUT 197 AND TEL AVIV 599.
LORD CARADON

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ISRAEL
20 November, 1967
Section 1

THE SECOND ARAB/ISRAEL WAR, 1967
THE AFTERMATH: POLITICAL

Mr. Hadow to Mr. Brown. (*Received 20 November*)

SUMMARY

1. The euphoria in Israel following her victory has been replaced by a sense of frustration, a hardening attitude towards the Arabs and increasing acrimony in Israel's relations with some of her former friends. (Paragraph 1.)

2. Both internally and externally Israel has met with unexpected difficulties. Consequently the sense of " Fortress Israel " has come to the top, as on previous occasions. (Paragraph 2.)

3. Israel achieved her objectives in the war, and more. Her immediate reaction was that, surely, the Arabs had now learned their lesson and would negotiate. Had any Arab leader or leaders then come forward they would probably have received generous terms. (Paragraphs 3–4.)

4. This euphoric period did not last. Israel's mood changed perceptibly in face of what she regarded as encouragement to the Arabs to believe that they had not really lost. (Paragraph 5.)

5. The present Government, brought together under wartime conditions and headed by a weak and indecisive Prime Minister, was singularly unsuited for the prosecution of Israel's interests. In the internal political struggle which has been brought to the forefront by the post-war problems, Mr. Eshkol, Mr. Allon and General Dayan have vied with each other to demonstrate how tough they can be. The decisions about the return of refugees from Jordan and Jewish re-settlement of the Etzion *bloc* result from weakness and disunity in the Government. Yet they have been welcomed by a short-sighted Press and public. (Paragraphs 6–7.)

6. As prospects for a settlement come no nearer, a body of Israeli opinion has emerged in favour of retaining the occupied territories on security, religious or historical grounds. The " Movement for the Entire Land of Israel " is actively and successfully campaigning on a non-party basis for public support. (Paragraph 8.)

7. Israel's terms for a settlement have never been explicitly spelt out, but they will almost certainly be based on the principle that she will only accept arrangements giving advantages at least comparable with those she enjoys at present. (Paragraphs 9–10.)

8. The Israelis' analysis of Arab psychology differs fundamentally from ours. They believe that magnanimity will be interpreted as weakness, but that if they stand firm the Arabs will sooner or later be forced to reach an accommodation with them. They see no good coming out of activities at the United Nations. British efforts in support of a Security Council resolution and our moves to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt are viewed with the gravest misgivings and have aroused hostile criticism. (Paragraphs 11–13.)

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9. The Israelis would probably flout any United Nations resolution they considered unacceptable. (Paragraph 14.)

10. Israel has come to attach more importance to security than to peace. In some ways she would prefer to see King Hussein and President Nasser go. Unless there is a breakthrough in the current situation, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Israel's frontiers will gel round the present ceasefire lines. Internal pressures (such as Arab sabotage and the problems of integrating 1,000,000 additional Arabs) seem more likely than external ones to force Israel to alter her position. But even so they are not likely to make Israel move in a hurry. (Paragraphs 15–16.)

11. Israel is not unduly worried by prognostications of a further "round" with the Arabs while she stands in a position to march on the neighbouring Arab capitals. This facile attitude rests on several dangerous assumptions and gives little hope of any inclination to flexibility which could give cause for optimism. Russian objectives are not clear, but in any event the prospects over the next few years for British interests in the Middle East are discouraging. (Paragraphs 17–18.)

(No. 42. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
Sir, *16 November, 1967.*

The general sense of euphoria and magnanimity which engulfed Israel on the morrow of victory has gradually given way to a growing sense of frustration as the peace which then seemed within grasp continues to elude her. The intervening months have been characterised by a hardening attitude towards the Arabs and increasing acrimony in Israel's relations with some of her former friends. I have the honour to review the developments which have led to this situation and to describe the prevailing mood in this country as it awaits the outcome of the current deliberations at the United Nations.

2. I noted at the end of my despatch No. 19 that in modern wars "the losers have not really lost and the winners have not really gained. Certainly, the problems for the winners seem more difficult than those for the losers". The second part of this contention has so far proved all too well founded. Both internally and externally Israel has met with unexpected difficulties. The awkward, though valued, relationship with the Soviet Union has been broken. France, staunchest friend and ally, has deserted her. Her relations with Britain have deteriorated, as our inevitable need became apparent to redress our standing with the Arab States where our major interests lie. And, with the diversion of the West's attention to the problems of refugees, the future of Jersualem, the fate of King Hussein and the continued closure of the Suez Canal, Israel sees the evaporation of some of the sympathy which supported her before and during the war. She is faced with the economic problems of the occupied territories as described in my despatch No. 36. Although a successful underground movement has failed to materialise on the West Bank, Israel continues to face a military situation of frequent incidents on her present lines both with Jordan and with Egypt. The dangers of escalation, as shown by the *Eilat* affair, are ever present. Critical advice or exhortation from outside has touched a sensitive nerve and, as has inevitably happened in the past, Jewish stubbornness, self-righteousness and the sense of "Fortress Israel", have come to the top. In short the reaction has been predictably one of xenophobic defiance which has further alienated the opinion of some foreign Governments, though possibly not yet of the Western world public at large. On the credit side there has been a noticeable growth of warmth in relations with the Federal German Republic and Rumania which, alone of the Eastern *bloc,* has shown herself willing to pursue a realistic but friendly policy towards Israel.

3. But if the war gave rise to special problems for Israel and failed to eradicate some of her old ones there were few Israelis who would have agreed in the immediate aftermath that the losers had not lost and the winners had not really gained. Israel went to war to break loose from what

appeared a grave threat to throttle her. By her overwhelming victory she achieved this objective and more. She felt she had emerged as a power in her own right in the Middle East. She was indebted to no-one but herself for her victory. Neither the West nor the East had been involved: King Hussein's wish that the Arabs should be left alone with the Israelis (which the Israelis must have heartily endorsed had they known of it) had been fulfilled. Her enemies were so militarily crippled that it appeared virtually impossible for them to try any further confrontation for a long time to come. Her forces were in occupation of large areas of enemy territory, rendering obsolete the old Armistice Lines of dissension and conflict, and where established on easily defended ceasefire lines. There were, for the first time, many cards in Israel's hands to exchange for a durable peace with the Arabs. Crowning all this, the Old City of Jerusalem was in Israel's hands; the very consummation of Zionism and the fulfilment of the hope which had held the Jewish people together for close on 2,000 years of exile.

4. The immediate reaction after the war was that, surely, this time the Arabs must have learned their lesson and that the real fruits of victory must lie in a lasting and durable settlement. The golden age was about to dawn; the Arabs would see, encouraged by West and East alike, the enormous advantages to them of peace and co-operation with Israel. Hand in hand the two branches of the Semites could march forward to transform the social and economic structure of the whole Middle East. So it was that, for a period, the Israelis showed every sign of being prepared to fall into what they would normally have considered the cardinal error of showing the maximum magnanimity to their conquered foes. I am confident that, if at this stage an Arab leader or Arab leaders collectively had come forward to say that they would like to negotiate a peace they would indeed have received the most generous terms, which apart from the return of territories would have involved the Israelis in large scale plans for economic co-operation, the settlement of the refugees and the general development of the Middle East. The one real casualty was King Hussein whom the Israelis considered to have behaved in a highly treacherous and irresponsible manner, not only towards Israel, but towards his Western friends. For him it was a case of "Never bright morning again". Nevertheless, even here there was a tendency to co-operate with Western efforts to portray the showing of the Jordan Arab Army as having been far better than that of any of the other Arabs. (This was against the evidence of Israel's own military experts who considered that the only really decent fight was put up by the Egyptians in the area of the angle of the Gaza Strip and Sinai.) But if King Hussein had come forward at that time his tarnished image in Israel's eyes could have been rehabilitated. Only on one point must this paragraph be qualified and that is as from the 7th of June the return of the Old City of Jerusalem either to Jordan or to an international body was quite unthinkable to any Israeli, whose mood was and still is that he would die rather than give it up.

5. This happy period lasted roughly up to and into the meetings of the Special Assembly of the United Nations, which was accepted as a necessary, though slightly dangerous, *entr'acte* which had to be gone through before the real process of direct peace-making could be entered upon. The mood changed perceptibly during the Assembly, when it was felt that its main result was to give the Arabs time to recover from their initial shock, to receive encouragement in the shape of fresh injections of arms, and to avoid facing up to the issue which seemed so clear cut to the Israelis. An early and unpleasant surprise was the attitude of some of Israel's friends and particularly the United Kingdom with regard to Jerusalem. The story once more became current (which I have now seen reproduced regrettably and very recently in the Adelphi paper on the war by the Institute for Strategic Studies) that the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine was accompanied by a secret agreement between Mr. Bevin and King Abdullah which would give to the latter not only the territories allotted to the Arabs by the United Nations Partition Plan, but the whole of Jerusalem in violation of United Nations Resolutions. What else, said the Israelis, could account for this new-found British sensitivity over Israel-occupied Jerusalem, when Britain had acquiesced so quickly in the Jordan occupation and had never raised a protest against Jordanian negation of all Jewish rights in the Holy City? Bitterness was increased by the

discovery of the wholesale desecration of Jewish graves and places of worship in the 20 years in which the Jordanians had been in occupation. Finally, though fortified by the failure of the Yugoslav Resolution and the success of the Latin-American draft (itself a fairly unacceptable document to the Israelis) they found to their dismay that, broadly speaking, the world community seemed tacitly to have accepted the thesis that it was too dangerous and therefore out of the question for any Arab leader or leaders to come forward to discuss peace with the Israelis. In short, a great part of the world was encouraging the Arabs to believe that they had not really lost while the Israelis had not really won. From this point the bubble of post-war euphoria seems to have burst and a harder line became apparent in both governmental and public thinking. Hope for Israel's co-operation in accepting back the "new" refugees began to dwindle as from this moment.

6. Mr. Eshkol's Government of all parties, which was brought together under wartime conditions, was singularly unsuited, in these indeterminate circumstances, for the prosecution of Israel's interests at the diplomatic level or for exercising her new-found responsibilities in the occupied areas. The Cabinet is sharply divided amongst itself and, under the Prime Minister's weak and indecisive leadership, lacks a sense of cohesion. Its members make contradictory statements and pursue conflicting policies. As Minister responsible for the military government of the occupied areas, General Dayan behaves very much as an independent ruler and brooks no interference by his colleagues, although he has now submitted to a certain degree of control over his public statements. The religious parties, from the outset, were the first to adopt "hawkish" attitudes based on the Bible. The circumstances of Israel's post-war problems have helped to bring to the forefront of the political life of the country the bid by the middle strata of Israeli-born political leaders, represented by General Dayan and Mr. Allon, to inherit the reins of Government from the immigrant generation of "old guard" politicians. This is a struggle which cuts across party lines and involves personal rivalries between various contenders for power and their followers. It has directly contributed to the progressively harder line adopted in official pronouncements over the last three months as Mr. Eshkol, Mr. Allon and General Dayan have each, in turn, sought to demonstrate that he can be a tougher Prime Minister than the others. It is a wry thought, but nevertheless a valid one, that in the unlikely event of the Arabs suddenly agreeing to direct negotiations, the Israel Cabinet would be caught completely off balance. The wrangling at the conference table would be as nothing to the dissensions within the Israel Government itself, which could well tear it apart. It is far easier for the Cabinet to show unity in intransigence.

7. Israel's highly questionable decisions on the conditions for the return of refugees from Jordan and the re-establishment of Jewish settlements in the Etzion *bloc* (with its implications for a more general return of Jewish settlers to the West Bank of Jordan) are a product of the basic weakness and lack of unity in the Government rather than of a carefully thought out policy for dealing with the areas under Israeli military occupation. They took no account of likely international repercussions nor of the possible Arab reactions. In neither case was the Government subjected initially to strong public pressure, but each short-sighted step as it was taken appears to have aroused considerable enthusiasm among an equally short-sighted Press and public. Whether or not these decisions have reduced the prospect of a negotiated settlement with the Arabs must be a matter of opinion. The Israelis would argue that they have brought this prospect nearer by, in the case of the refugees, adding to King Hussein's internal problems and, as regards Etzion, putting him on notice that he had better hurry up if he wants to regain his lost territories.

8. As time has gone on, bringing a settlement no nearer, a body of opinion has emerged in Israel which favours holding on to the captured (or as they prefer to call them "liberated") territories for their own sake. Those who adhere to this point of view place no faith in any agreements made with the Arabs and believe that the strong right arm of Israel is the only guarantee of her security. They argue that the ceasefire lines are more tenable boundaries, militarily, than the pre-war frontiers; that they give Israel's defences much-needed depth and more than double the warning time in case of future air attacks on her cities; and that they place her forces in a position to deter further Arab aggression by threatening to move

against Damascus, Amman or even Cairo. There are also others who, for religious, historical or nationalistic reasons, would strongly oppose any proposal to retreat from any of the occupied territory. Both these streams of thought have found expression in the recent formation of an organisation calling itself "The Movement for the Entire Land of Israel", which embraces many prominent Israelis from all walks of life, and is actively campaigning on a non-party basis for public support. It is my impression that this movement is beginning to gather increasing support in the country and that it may well have its sympathisers in the Cabinet.

9. But, for the time being, official policy expresses a willingness to enter into direct negotiations with the Arab States, either collectively or individually. The terms on which the Israelis envisage that a settlement might be reached have never been explicitly spelt out, but they would almost certainly be based on the principle that Israel could only accept arrangements which gave her advantages at least comparable with those she now enjoys as a result of her occupation of captured territory. In the case of Jordan, Israel would be likely to insist on certain frontier adjustments to widen the Jerusalem corridor and the narrow waist of the Sharon Plain, the demilitarisation of that part of the West Bank which was returned to Jordan, and the retention of the whole of Jerusalem as part of Israel. On this last point, as I have said, there is no room for compromise in the Israelis' attitude. No Government could survive in Israel which dared contemplate a surrender of the Old City. While they may be prepared to concede some form of extra-territorial status for the Christian and Muslim Holy Places, they will make no concession on sovereignty. Equally, there would be willingness to come to some arrangement with Jordan over the division of the spoils of the tourist traffic, but the generosity of the terms likely to be offered dwindles with each week that passes.

10. Israel's terms for a settlement with Egypt would involve the retention of the Gaza Strip, the demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula, and guarantees of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. For Israel, passage through the Canal is important only from a prestige point of view, and she might be prepared not to press this point if an agreement acceptable to her in all other respects could be reached. The possibility of any settlement with Syria seems for the present to be academic. Israel would expect to remain on the Golan Heights and only to withdraw her forces under arrangements which permanently removed any Syrian threat to the settlements in the Hula Valley and on the eastern shore of Lake Galilee.

11. In assessing the prospects of reaching a settlement with the Arabs, the Israelis' analysis of Arab psychology differs fundamentally from ours. They believe that experience has taught them that any show of magnanimity will be interpreted as weakness and any hint of flexibility as lack of purpose. They believe that if they stand firm on their conquests the Arabs will sooner or later be forced to reach an accommodation with Israel. They can see no good coming out of activities at the United Nations designed to bring about an internationally imposed solution, since they are convinced that these activities only encourage the Arabs to go on deluding themselves that they can recover by diplomatic means what they lost by war without ever having to face up to a real peace with Israel. It would suit Israel best if the present session of the United Nations General Assembly were to end, like the last one, with negative results. She has no wish to have her own hands tied by a Security Council resolution, nor any confidence that such a resolution, however "balanced", would be faithfully observed by the Arabs, or properly policed by the United Nations.

12. Against this background, British efforts to work for a resolution in the Security Council are viewed with the gravest misgivings and have aroused a great deal of hostile criticism in Israel. The impression created in October by reports from New York was that it was the British delegation who were forcing the pace. All the latent Israeli suspicions of British motives in the Middle East have since come to the surface. Our actions are seen as indicative of a change to a more pro-Arab policy designed to serve short-term British interests in the Arab world at the expense of our relations with Israel.

13. The announcement of your intention of seeking a restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt was immediately criticised as being misguided at a time when President Nasser's stock is all but depleted. Israelis said it would merely increase

Egyptian intransigence and delay, rather than advance, the prospects of re-opening the Suez Canal. The Israel Government, while professing understanding of the problems created for Britain by the continued closure of the Suez Canal, have repeatedly made it clear that they have no intention of falling in with what they regard as Egyptian blackmail tactics, by agreeing to withdraw their forces from the east bank of the Canal in advance of an overall peace settlement. To withdraw even a short distance would be militarily difficult in view of the absence of lateral communications between their positions in Sinai except along the Canal itself, and would involve giving up the commanding advantages they now enjoy of being able to keep Egyptian ground and air forces at a safe distance from their cities.

14. The Israelis are, however, probably not as worried by our activities in New York as the violence of recent local Press reactions might suggest, since they seem confident that they can rely on the Americans to block any resolution in the Security Council which would require them to withdraw their forces from occupied territory without cast-iron guarantees that this would be accompanied or immediately preceded by Arab recognition and a renunciation of belligerency. Even without this safeguard, I have little doubt that Israel would unhesitatingly flout any resolution which she found unacceptable, unless this was backed up by the threat of certain and effective sanctions. She would not be deterred by considerations of world opinion, still less by any regard for the United Nations, an institution which she holds in contempt. (I think it was Mr. Eban who remarked not long ago that if the Arabs were to propose a resolution declaring that the world was flat, they would get 40 votes for it immediately.)

15. The recent Israel Press campaign against us was not simply an ill-tempered outburst engineered by the feeling that we were working against their interests at the United Nations. It reflects basic differences of attitude towards the problems of the Middle East. The Israelis have now, as a result of the last three months, come to attach more importance to security than to peace. They have little sympathy with our policy of bolstering up King Hussein who, when the crunch came, proved to be no less an enemy of Israel than President Nasser. It is of little consequence to them whether Jordan survives or is swallowed up by Syria or Iraq. Indeed, in some ways they would prefer an openly hostile régime in Amman since its influence would be less effective in Western capitals, and they would at least know where they stood. As for Egypt, the Israelis believe that unless he is rescued by the West, President Nasser is on the way out. They prefer to take their chance that his successor will be easier to live with.

16. Unless there is a breakthrough at the United Nations, or Jordan and Egypt open negotiations with Israel in the near future, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Israel's frontiers will gel round the present ceasefire lines. I am bound to say that I find it difficult, given the current atmosphere in Israel, to see what effective pressure can be brought to bear to make the Israelis budge from these ceasefire lines in default of the kind of guarantees of their security which they demand. Seen from here, the only pressures which may force them to alter their position will be internal ones. In the short term, continued and successful Arab attempts at sabotage and subversion might make Israel wonder whether retaining the West Bank was worthwhile. And in the long term, the more far-sighted are exercised with the question of whether the presence of anything up to 1 million additional Arabs in the occupied territories does not spell the end of the Jewish State. But neither of these pressures is likely to force Israel to act in haste. The security and military forces think that they are capable of rooting out all those Arabs who have connections with terrorist organisations and believe that once this is done the West Bank population will no longer be afraid to co-operate with the Israel authorities. But even if the acts of sabotage continue I suspect that Israel will think very hard before she feels forced to relinquish the West Bank short of a peace treaty with Jordan, since the view generally held here is that, if terrorism is to continue, it is better that Israel should patrol the Jordan and have her civil and military authorities on the West Bank to search for the terrorists. This is considered preferable to returning to the pre-war situation which offered terrorists a salient protruding deep into Israel from which to conduct their activities, and a refuge to which they could return after they had done their business. As regards the Jewish character of Israel if the West Bank and its fast breeding Arab

population are retained, this is a question which need not be faced up to immediately. It would take at least one generation before the threat of being eclipsed by the Arab population materialised, and since Israel at the present moment is concerned with her security in the immediate future she feels she can well afford to wait some time before turning her mind to this problem, which might be resolved in a variety of ways not involving the absorbtion of the Arabs as Israel citizens with voting rights.

17. In conclusion, the Israelis are not unduly worried by prognostications of a future and possibly "final round" by the Arabs. They appreciate, with what is probably supportable military expert thinking, that a pre-emptive air strike is not merely a question of getting up five minutes earlier than the other fellow. They discard the possibility of the Arabs ever reaching the operational and technological finesse which underlay the Israel Air Force's success at the outset of the Six Day War. They accept that they may well have to suffer far greater civilian casualties and damage, but they are confident that a first-strike by the Arabs could be frustrated even if one were mounted. Israel can therefore afford to sit on her present gains either until the Arabs see sense and negotiate their return, or until a further "round", when an Israel occupation of Amman, Damascus and Cairo could lead to a definitive end of the war and peace negotiations. All this rather facile approach is based on several dangerous assumptions: that the Soviet Union will never intervene actively and that there will continue to be a tacit understanding between the United States and the Soviets that the struggle for influence in the Middle East must be conducted within certain prescribed bounds: that local wars will remain conventional, or that Israel's ability to achieve a nuclear capacity first will serve as a deterrent to Arab nuclear ambitions: and finally (a rash assumption in view of the history of the Middle East over the last 20 years) that there will be no accidents—either in the Arab world or internally in Israel or in her relations with the Diaspora or the community of free nations.

18. I fear that this despatch ends on a gloomy note, but I can see little hope here of any inclination to flexibility which could give cause for optimism about the possibility of a Middle East settlement. Given Arab disinclination to turn 20 years of hostility into peace as the result of negotiations with the Israelis, and given the strength of Israel's military, economic and physical position and the basic cohesion of the nation behind a tough and intransigent line, the outlook must be one of tension and instability for several years to come. Perhaps this is what the Russians want: their policy in the area has hitherto been one of "tension without explosion" and perhaps all they have changed in is, having learned their lesson about their inability to control explosion when it comes to the point, they think by a tighter imperial hold on their clients they can be more successful in their control over the coming years. Worse still, they may consider that, in due course, it may pay them to permit an explosion, which this time ends to their advantage. Either way the prospects for British interests in the area are discouraging. We would seem to be in for the return to a prolonged period when our major interests in the Arab world will be at the mercy of Arab irredentism and hostility towards Israel, in which we shall inevitably be caught up. For the Arabs themselves the outlook is really no less forbidding. They have always claimed that Israel imperialism aimed at frontiers from the Nile to the Euphrates. This, I am sure, was never the Israelis' wish, but recent events and the failure of the Arabs to draw correct conclusions from their débâcle in the latest war has brought the Israelis perilously near accepting that one day they may well have to fight for their survival on fronts very far removed from the Armistice Lines as they existed on the 4th of June, 1967.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Bonn, Jedda, Kuwait, Moscow, Nicosia, Paris, Rabat, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington; to the United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations in New York; to Her Majesty's Consul-General, Jerusalem; and to the British Interests Sections in Algiers, Cairo and Khartoum.

I have, &c.

R. M. HADOW.

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO.3374 22 NOVEMBER 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.3374 OF 22 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, OTTAWA AND OTHER
POSTS.

MY TELEGRAM NO.3322, NOT TO ALL. MIDDLE EAST :
SECURITY COUNCIL.

WHEN THE COUNCIL MET TO CONTINUE ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE U.A.R. COMPLAINT THIS AFTERNOON, ISRAEL, THE U.A.R., JORDAN AND SYRIA PARTICIPATED AT THEIR OWN REQUEST WITHOUT RIGHT OF VOTE.

2. TOMEH (SYRIA) SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WAS TODAY CONSIDERING ANOTHER PHASE IN THE TRAGEDY OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. BUT THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THESE VICTIMS OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN THE U.K. DRAFT, EXCEPT BELATEDLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REFUGEE QUESTION. HE THEN CRITICISED THE U.K. DRAFT AT LENGTH. IT CONTAINED NO REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 1 OF THE U.N. CHARTER. ITS MENTION OF WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAELI ARMED FORCES WAS MADE SUBJECT TO A SCORE OF CONCESSIONS BY THE ARAB STATES, WHICH AMOUNTED TO A LIQUIDATION OF THE WHOLE PALESTINE QUESTION. 20 YEARS OF U.N. EXPERIENCE IN TRYING TO SOLVE THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT, AND COUNTLESS U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON THE SUBJECT, HAD BEEN DISREGARDED IN THE BRITISH TEXT. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE RIGHT OF THE REFUGEES TO REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION. CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT, TOO, WAS ANY MENTION OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN JUNE, E.G.ON THE CEASE-FIRE, JERUSALEM, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, ALL OF WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD FLOUTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE BRITISH DRAFT OFFERED THE AGGRESSORS THE ILLEGAL FRUITS OF THEIR PLUNDERING. THE U.N. RECORDS SHOWED CLEARLY ENOUGH WHO HAD BEEN THE PRIME BELLIGERENT FOR 20 YEARS. EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN TIME AND AGAIN THAT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE COULD NOT BE IMPOSED BY FORCE.

/3. MAKONNEN

3. MAKONNEN (ETHIOPIA) SAID THAT THE COUNCIL'S PARAMOUNT PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE DESPATCH OF A U.N. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST, TO WORK OUT THE BASIS OF A LASTING SOLUTION. THE COUNCIL MUST NOW DECIDE ON A SET OF GUIDE-LINES FOR THE REPRESENTATIVE, AND HERE TIME WAS OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE, AS RECENT BORDER INCIDENTS PROVED. HIS DELEGATION'S SUPPORT WOULD DEPEND ON THREE CONSIDERATIONS: ANY PROPOSALS FOR A SOLUTION MUST BE BASED ON THE U.N. CHARTER: THE RESOLUTION MUST BE BALANCED: AND THE GUIDE-LINES FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE BROADLY ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, ALL ISRAELI FORCES MUST WITHDRAW FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT. ALL STATES OR CLAIMS OF BELLIGERENCY MUST BE TERMINATED. JUSTICE MUST BE DONE TO THE REFUGEES. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS MUST BE GUARANTEED FOR ALL NATIONS. HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR ANY PROPOSALS WHICH MET THE ABOVE CRITERIA. HE THEN APPEALED TO ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO PUT THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND THE COUNCIL'S EFFORTS TO REACH A SOLUTION. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE SPIRIT OF CO-OPERATION SHOWN IN THE SPEECHES OF THE SOVIET AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AT EARLIER MEETINGS. HE ALSO APPEALED TO THE PARTIES TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

4. PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) SAID THAT WHEN HE PRESENTED THE THREE-POWER DRAFT ON 9 NOVEMBER, THE CO-SPONSORS HAD PROCEEDED FROM CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS:

(A) A FAIR BALANCE AND MUTUALITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS:

(B) A SPELLING OUT OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A JUST PEACE:

(C) SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER.

THE TREND OF SPEECHES DURING THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION HAD SHOWN THERE WAS UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD WITHDRAW AT ONCE FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. SECONDLY, IT WAS

/AGREED

AGREED THAT ALL STATES SHOULD END CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY. THE THREE-POWER DRAFT TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF THESE PRINCIPLES. IT ALSO INCORPORATED A THIRD PRINCIPLE, THE RIGHT OF EVERY STATE TO BE SECURE WITHIN ITS BORDERS. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE PRINCIPLES, HE BELIEVED THAT A SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE AND NAVIGATION PROBLEMS COULD BE WORKED OUT, WITH THE HELP OF PROCEDURES SET OUT IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE CHARTER.

5. FUNDAMENTAL TO THE INDIAN POSITION, HOWEVER,WAS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE. ONCE WE WERE AGREED ON THIS PRINCIPLE, THE PROCESS OF BRINGING PEACE TO THE AREA BECAME AN INTEGRAL WHOLE. HE HAD LISTENED CAREFULLY TO BRITISH STATEMENTS IN THE COUNCIL ON THE PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY. HE THEN QUOTED TWO STATEMENTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (IN THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON 21 JUNE AND IN YOUR GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPEECH ON 26 SEPTEMBER), WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PASSAGES ON WITHDRAWAL, THE NEED FOR A DURABLE PEACE, THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS, ETC. HE SAID IT WAS THE INDIAN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BRITISH DRAFT, IF ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL, WOULD COMMIT THE COUNCIL TO THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE WHOLE OF SINAI, GAZA, THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM, THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY. IT FOLLOWED THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT USE THE PHRASE ''SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES'' IN PARAGRAPH 1 (II) OF THE U.K. DRAFT TO ACQUIRE ANY PERMANENT TERRITORIAL GAINS, THOUGH MUTUAL TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS WERE NOT RULED OUT. THE INDIAN VOTE ON THE U.K. DRAFT WOULD BE DETERMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WITH WHICH THE TWO OTHER CO-SPONSORS OF THE THREE-POWER DRAFT AGREED. THEY WOULD NOT PRESS THEIR DRAFT TO THE VOTE AT THIS STAGE.

6. I THEN SPOKE (TEXT TELEXED SEPARATELY).

7. GOLDBERG (U.S.A.) SAID HIS DELEGATION WAS PREPARED TO GRANT PRIORITY TO THE U.K. DRAFT RESOLUTION AND WOULD VOTE FOR IT.

/IF THE

IF THE BRITISH DRAFT WAS ADOPTED, THE U.S. RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE PRESSED TO THE VOTE. HE SAID THAT MEMBERS NO DOUBT HAD REASONS OF THEIR OWN FOR COMMENTING ON THE U.K. TEXT AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF IT. BUT THE RESOLUTION, WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT THOUGHT ACCORDED WITH U.S. POLICY, WAS WHAT BOUND THE COUNCIL.

8. THERE BEING NO OBJECTION, THE COUNCIL THEN PROCEEDED TO THE VOTE, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT THE THREE-POWER DRAFT (S/8227) THE U.S. DRAFT (S/8229) AND THE SOVIET DRAFT (S/8236) AUTHORISING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UNTSO PERSONNEL IN THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR TO 90, WOULD NOT BE PUT TO THE VOTE FOR THE TIME BEING.

9. WHEN THE U.K. DRAFT RESOLUTION (S/8247) WAS VOTED ON, IT WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY.

10. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

F O PASS MOSCOW 604, PARIS 610, AMMAN 463, CAIRO 209, TEL AVIV 608, RIO DE JANEIRO 82, BUENOS AIRES 107, NEW DELHI 84, LAGOS 22, COPENHAGEN 143, SOFIA 14 AND BEIRUT 206.

LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EASTERN DEPT.

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CEM

Record of a Meeting between Prime Ministers and Canadian Prime Ministers at No.10. 12 noon Wednesday Nov. 22nd 1967 (Exwoet)

Middle East (Pt 8)

4. The Middle East

Mr. Pearson expressed concern at the continuing uncertainty in the area and at the delay in reaching agreement on a resolution at the United Nations. It now seemed however as if agreement could be reached broadly on the terms of the U.K. draft. The Prime Minister said that this might perhaps be possible, since the draft seemed moderately unacceptable to both sides. This was usually the best basis for a compromise at the United Nations. But he agreed that the situation remained serious.

Top Copy on Canada Nov.'65

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3375 22 NOVEMBER 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3375 OF 22 NOVEMBER, RFI TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, RIO DE JANEIRO, BUENOS AIRES, OTTAWA, NEW DELHI. LAGOS, COPENHAGEN, SOFIA AND BEIRUT.

M.I.P.T.: MIDDLE EAST - SECURITY COUNCIL.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VOTE ON THE U.K. DRAFT RESOLUTION, KUTZNETZOV (USSR) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION DID NOT CONSIDER IT NECESSARY AT PRESENT TO INSIST ON A VOTE ON THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION (S/8233).

2. ADEBO (NIGERIA) SPEAKING IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, SAID THAT THE THREE-POWER DRAFT HAD BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM FAIRLY BUT CLEARLY HAD NOT SATISFIED EVERYBODY. ITS SPONSORS HAD ATTEMPTED TO PRODUCE A RESOLUTION WHICH WAS COMPLETELY BALANCED. BUT THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE COULD NOT AGREE TO ACCEPTING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN USELESS TO HAVE SENT OUT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED UNDER THESE TERMS. NOW HOWEVER THE COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED A RESOLUTION WHICH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE WHOSE EXPERIENCE AND FAIR-MINDEDNESS HAD ACHIEVED WHAT HAD BEEN CONSIDERED ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. HE BACKED THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE'S APPEAL TO DELEGATES TO KEEP THEIR OWN OPINIONS ON WHAT THIS OR THAT CLAUSE MEANT. THE RESOLUTION MUST BE ACCEPTED AS A WHOLE. SUCCESS WOULD COME IF TODAY'S ACTION WAS FOLLOWED UP BY CONSISTENT AND COURAGEOUS EFFORTS IN THE FUTURE. NO ONE MUST ATTEMPT TO CHEAT UNDER THE RESOLUTION.

3. EBAN (ISRAEL) REGRETTED THE SYRIAN ''HYMN OF HATRED AND AGGRESSION'' FROM A GOVERNMENT WHICH ITSELF HAD DISRUPTED THE PEACE IN THE AREA. THE POLICY OF HIS GOVERNMENT REMAINED AS SET OUT IN THE COUNCIL ON 13 AND 16 NOVEMBER. ISRAEL WOULD RESPECT AND FULLY MAINTAIN THE SITUATION EMBODIED IN THE

/CEASE-FIRE .....

CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS, UNTIL IT WAS SUCCEEDED BY PEACE TREATIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES ENDING THE STATE OF WAR: ESTABLISHING AGREED, RECOGNIZED AND SECURE BOUNDARIES: GUARANTEEING FREE NAVIGATION FOR ALL SHIPPING, INCLUDING ISRAEL, IN ALL WATERWAYS LEADING TO AND FROM THE RED SEA: COMMITTING ALL SIGNATORIES TO THE PERMANENT AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND RESPECT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY OF ALL MIDDLE EASTERN STATES: AND ENSURING A STABLE AND MUTUALLY GUARANTEED SECURITY. SUCH A PEACE SETTLEMENT, "DIRECTLY NEGOTIATED AND CONTRACTUALLY CONFIRMED, WOULD CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH REFUGEE PROBLEMS COULD BE JUSTLY AND EFFECTIVELY SOLVED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CO-OPERATION". IT WAS NOW AXIOMATIC, IN HIS VIEW, "THAT MOVEMENT FROM THE CEASE-FIRE LINES CAN BE ENVISAGED ONLY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE ESTABLISHING RECOGNIZED AND SECURE BOUNDARIES". THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED TODAY HAD, AS ITS "CENTRAL AFFIRMATION", THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A JUST AND LASTING PEACE, INCLUDING SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES. THERE WAS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS ONLY WITHIN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT PEACE THAT OTHER PRINCIPLES COULD BE GIVEN EFFECT.

4. EBAN STRESSED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT, IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH EACH OTHER, THE PARTIES HAD THE SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHAPING THEIR COMMON FUTURE. IT WAS THE DUTY OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, AT THE BEHEST OF THE PARTIES, TO ACT IN THE MEASURE THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE PROVIDED AND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT COULD BE ADVANCED. MEMBER STATES DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH THOSE TO WHOM THEY ADDRESSED THEIR CLAIMS. IN HIS VIEW, "ONLY WHEN THEY COME TOGETHER, WILL THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL REVEAL THE FULL POTENTIALITIES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT". THE PROPOSALS BY INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION FAILED TO WIN SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY RESTED ON THE WRONG PREMISE THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FORMED ON THE BASIS OF THE SITUATION OF JUNE 4. BUT RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS AND IDEAS REFLECTED AN UNDERSTANDING

/THAT .....

THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE REQUIRED AN EXPLICIT RESPECT OF ISRAEL'S NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS. AS TO THE INDIAN INTERPRETATION, ISRAEL ''READS IN THE RESOLUTION WHAT IS IN THE TEXT'', AND BELIEVED THAT PROVISIONS WHICH HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY EXCLUDED, SHOULD NOT BE READ INTO IT.

5. GOLDBERG (USA) EXPRESSED HIS GRATIFICATION AT THE UNANIMOUS SUPPORT WHICH THE U.K. RESOLUTION HAD RECEIVED, ESPECIALLY AS IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE EFFORTS WHICH MANY MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY THE U.K. AND THE LATIN AMERICANS, HAD MADE TOWARDS THIS OUTCOME. PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE PARTIES RECEIVED AND CO-OPERATED WITH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. HIS DELEGATION WOULD HAVE OFFERED AN AMENDMENT ON THE NEED TO END THE ARMS RACE, BUT FOR THE FEAR THAT THIS MIGHT UPSET THE BALANCE OF THE U.K. RESOLUTION. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S MANDATE DID NOT EXCLUDE THIS IMPORTANT AND URGENT REQUIREMENT OF PEACE, AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED BY THE UNANIMITY OF THE U.S.A. AND THE USSR ON THIS POINT. HE SUGGESTED THAT AN ''OPEN FILE'' SHOULD BE KEPT ON ALL SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY ARMS INTO THE AREA. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NEED ALL THE HELP HE COULD GET, AND GOLDBERG ONCE MORE PLEDGED UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS EFFORTS.

6. BERARD (FRANCE) WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE CLEARLY DEFINED PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE THREE-POWER DRAFT AND THE JULY LATIN AMERICAN PROPOSALS, BUT AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED ON THAT BASIS. HE CONGRATULATED THE U.K., REMARKING THAT NO SOLUTION COULD SATISFY ALL PARTIES. THE RESOLUTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEARER ON THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BUT THERE WAS NO AMBIGUITY ON THE WITHDRAWAL CONDITION IN THE FRENCH TEXT, WHICH WAS THE SAME AS THE ENGLISH ONE, ESPECIALLY AS THE U.K. HAD STRESSED THE LINK BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND THE INADMISSIBILITY OF TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION BY FORCE. HE NOTED

/THAT .....

THAT THE TEXT STRESSED THE NEED FOR A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, WHICH HAD REACHED NEW AND TRAGIC DIMENSIONS. HE HAD VOTED FOR THE U.K. TEXT BECAUSE THIS WAS A POSITIVE DECISION, A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE LONG AND ARDUOUS EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACE. HE HOPED FOR A SPIRIT OF CONCILIATION FROM THE GREAT POWERS.

7. KUZNETSOV (USSR) WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE ADOPTION OF THE SOVIET DRAFT WHICH WAS MOST IN CONFORMITY WITH THE NEED TO ELIMINATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION. HE AGREED WITH THE INDIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE RESOLUTION: AS THE PRIME PRINCIPLE WAS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE 5 JUNE WAR. THIS INTERPRETATION WAS CONFIRMED BY THE PREAMBULAR REFERENCE TO THE INADMISSIBILITY OF TERRITORIAL GAINS BY WAR. THE PHRASE ''SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES'' COULD THEREFORE NOT BE A PRETEXT FOR ISRAELI FORCES TO HOLD ON TO ANY OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY. THE WHOLE COUNCIL AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE MAIN CONTENT AND THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE RESOLUTION.

8. SILOS (BRAZIL) SAID THAT THE BRITISH RESOLUTION DID NOT GIVE FULL SATISFACTION, BUT CONTAINED MOST OF THE POINTS PROPOSED BY THE LATIN AMERICANS AT THE FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION. THE INVALIDITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE HAD GONE UNCHALLENGED, BORDERS MIGHT BE CHANGED BY FREELY CONCLUDED AGREEMENTS AND ISRAELI SHIPPING MUST HAVE FREE TRANSIT IN THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE GULF OF AQABA.

9. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM RESOLUTION MET THE CRITERION OF GETTING DIPLOMATIC PROCESSES UNDER WAY, SINCE IT TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE ESSENTIAL POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES, AND INCORPORATED IDEAS FROM ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. IT PROVIDED A FAIR, BALANCED, NON-PREJUDICIAL BASIS FOR DESPATCHING THE SPECIAL

/REPRESENTATIVE .....

REPRESENTATIVE AND THE UNANIMOUS VOTE GAVE HIM THE BEST POSSIBLE START IN HIS TASK.

10. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM RESOLUTION WAS THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COULD PRODUCE TO DEAL WITH AN AREA WHICH WAS A MANIFEST DANGER TO WORLD PEACE. SOME OF THE POSITIVE STEPS HE HAD WISHED TO SEE WERE INCLUDED IN THE RESOLUTION BUT OTHERS WOULD HAVE PROVED UNACCEPTABLE.

11. RIAD (UAR) RESTATED EGYPTIAN POLICY, ESPECIALLY ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL, WHICH MUST BE TO THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BEFORE 5 JUNE. HE STRESSED THAT THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE COULD NOT BE BARTERED AWAY.

RIFAI (JORDAN) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY WAS BASED ON THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL FROM ALL TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT. THE DEBATES IN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY HAD SHOWN THAT BOTH THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB SOIL AND THE MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL DURING OR AS A RESULT OF THEIR OCCUPATION WERE CONTRARY TO THE CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND REJECTED BY MOST OF THE MEMBERSHIP.

12. RUDA (ARGENTINA) SAID THAT CALM AND EFFECTIVE DECISIONS WERE NEEDED, INVOLVING MUTUAL CONCESSIONS. SIMPLE CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING. THIS THINKING WAS BEHIND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE LATIN AMERICANS TO THE ASSEMBLY ON 4 JULY. HE WAS GLAD THAT MANY OF THE LATIN SUGGESTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN UP BY THE COUNCIL TODAY. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN READY TO TABLE A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE ASSEMBLY DRAFT PUT FORWARD BY THE LATINS, BUT WHEN THEY HAD LEARNT THAT THE BRITISH DRAFT WOULD HAVE THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PARTIES, THEY DROPPED THEIR INITIATIVE. NONETHELESS, HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED SOME AMENDMENTS TO THE BRITISH TEXT: FOR EXAMPLE THE PREAMBLE MIGHT HAVE REFERRED TO THE CHARTER

/AS A .....

AS A WHOLE NOT JUST TO CHAPTER 2: ON WITHDRAWAL, A CLEARER TEXT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE. HE THEN COMMENTED FURTHER ON DETAILS OF THE BRITISH DRAFT.

13. TSURUOKA (JAPAN) SAID HE WAS DELIGHTED THAT A CONSENSUS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, AND HOPED THE MANDATE AS ADOPTED WOULD ENABLE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT. TO THIS END, THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES WAS ESSENTIAL. HE CONGRATULATED THE BRITISH DELEGATE FOR HIS UNTIRING EFFORTS. BORCH (DENMARK) REITERATED HIS STATEMENT MADE TO THE COUNCIL ON 9 NOVEMBER. THE U.K. RESOLUTION WAS A COMPROMISE IN THE BEST SENSE OF THE WORD, AS IT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF ALL INVOLVED. LIU (CHINA) SPOKE IN SIMILAR VEIN.

14. GOLDBERG (U.S.A.) SAID THAT IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, VARIOUS MEMBERS HAD EXPRESSED VIEWS OF THEIR OWN. HE STRESSED ONCE AGAIN THAT VOTING HAD TAKEN PLACE ON THE RESOLUTION, NOT ON EACH INTERPRETATION VOLUNTEERED ON THE TEXT. KANTE (MALI) SUPPORTED THE INDIAN DELEGATE'S STATEMENT BEFORE THE VOTE. WITHDRAWAL REMAINED THE PRECONDITION TO ANY PROGRESS IN THE AREA. BY A ''JUST SOLUTION'' OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, HIS DELEGATION MEANT THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON THE PALESTINE REFUGEES.

15. TOMEH (SYRIA) AND EBAN (ISRAEL) EXCHANGED RIGHTS OF REPLY. EBAN STRESSED THAT HE WOULD COMMUNICATE TO HIS GOVERNMENT FOR INFORMATION THE TEXT OF THE U.K. RESOLUTION AND NOTHING ELSE. AFTER THEY HAD STUDIED THE RESOLUTION HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD DETERMINE THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT IN THE LIGHT OF THE CRITERIA SET OUT IN HIS FIRST INTERVENTION (PARAGRAPHS 3-4 ABOVE).

16. THE MEETING ADJOURNED AT 7 P.M.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS TO MOSCOW 605, PARIS 611, AMMAN 464, CAIRO 210, TEL AVIV 609, RIO DE JANEIRO 83, BUENOS AIRES 108, NEW DELHI 85, LAGOS 23, COPENHAGEN 144, SOFIA 15 AND BEIRUT 207.

LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PW

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M. East Politics) P8

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/242 (1967)
22 November 1967

RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd meeting,
on 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Subject

सत्यमेव जयते

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No T 302/67

INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2.
22nd November, 1967

K

Dear Mr Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit to you the following message from the Prime Minister of India:-

Begins . Thank you for your message of 19th November. I entirely agree that a crucial stage has now been reached and that it is most important to utilise the present opportunity to pass a resolution in the Security Council which would lay down the basic principles which would guide a United Nations representative in his efforts to reach a settlement.

Regarding the resolution sponsored by Mali, Nigeria and India, you will have noted that while presenting the Draft Resolution to the Security Council, the representatives of both India and Nigeria indicated that whereas they had made every effort to present a fair and balanced formulation of all the principles and problems relevant to the situation, they were open to suggestions which would help in achieving a reasonable consensus. If such a consensus is possible on the basis of the resolution proposed by the United Kingdom, India would be only too happy to help in the process and to give its support. However, in order to achieve this purpose, it may be necessary to make some amendments to the Draft Resolution proposed by the United Kingdom or to explain in the Council the understanding of the resolution on the subject of the withdrawal of forces to positions occupied by them before the June war. These matters are being discussed between our Permanent Representatives in New York and it is my earnest hope that some mutually acceptable arrangements will be found.

...../2

I am happy to note the earnest endeavours which Lord Caradon and his delegation in New York have made and are making to find a basis for an acceptable agreement. I wish him all success and am sure that he already has the fullest co-operation of the Indian delegation. Ends.

Yours very sincerely,

Dwarkanath Chatterjee

(D. N. Chatterjee)

The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, O. B. E., M. P.,
Prime Minister,
No. 10, Downing Street,
London, S. W. 1.

No. 10

Registry No.

DRAFT

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From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(8635) Dd.033274 300m 10/66 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER HELD AT THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION RESIDENCE ON THURSDAY, 23 NOVEMBER, 1967 at 2.45 p.m.

Present:

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.
Mr. Lester Pearson
Sir Paul Gore-Booth
Mr. Charles Ritchie

CANADA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Brown asked Mr. Pearson whether, if as a result of the resolution in the Security Council and the appointment of the U.N. Special Representative a step would be taken towards the opening of the Suez Canal, and a United Nations Force was required, Canada would be willing to participate.

2. Mr. Pearson replied that he would not rule this out, but the Canadian Government would have to think very carefully and would certainly have to

/insist

d.033009 Gp.863

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

insist that the terms on which a Canadian force were stationed were clear and unambiguous so that there was no danger of a repetition of what had happened in May/June last.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office
S.W.1

24 November, 1967

My dear Michael,

You sent us a copy of the message to the Prime Minister from the Indian Prime Minister about the Middle East, which was conveyed in the High Commissioner's letter of 22 November.

We have discussed this with the Commonwealth Office who have suggested that an oral reply be delivered by either our High Commissioner or by the Minister of State in the Commonwealth Office when they see Mrs. Ghandi on Tuesday, 28 November. The Commonwealth Office are, I understand, replying to you in this sense and we are in touch with them about the form of reply.

Yours ever,
Derek.

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s)

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PRIVACY MARKING
~~*In Confidence*~~
~~*En Clair*~~ ~~*Code*~~ *Cypher*

Draft Telegram to:—
New Delhi

No. .....

(Date) .....

And to:—

Repeat to:—
UKMIS New York;
Washington

Saving to:—

Distribution:—
C.U.:Sth.Asia
F.U.:Eastern
U.N.Political
M.E.W.& U.N.

Copies to:—

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[*Security classification —if any*] CONFIDENTIAL

[*Privacy marking —if any*] .....

[*Codeword—if any*] .....

PRIORITY

Addressed to NEW DELHI

telegram No. ..... *(date)* .....

And to .....

repeated for information to UKMIS NEW YORK: WASHINGTON

.....

Saving to .....

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL. NO.3386

MIDDLE EAST

We have already telegraphed you the text of Mrs. Gandhi's reply to the Prime Minister's message about the Middle East. You will also have seen from the telegram under reference that Lord Cardon would like a special message of gratitude to be conveyed to the Government of India.

2. Accordingly would you pass the following message to Mrs. Gandhi from the Prime Minister or alternatively arrange for Mr. George Thomas to convey the message IMIFT orally if he sees Mrs. Gandhi early next week.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
~~Top Secret~~ ~~Secret~~ Confidential ~~Restricted~~ ~~Unclassified~~	~~Flash~~ ~~Immediate~~ }* Priority ~~Routine~~

PRIVACY MARKING
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Draft Telegram to:—
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Washington.

Saving to:—

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M.E.W.& U.N.
F.U.: Eastern
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(Date) .....

Despatched .....

T307/67.

[*Security classification —if any*] CONFIDENTIAL

[*Privacy marking —if any*] .....

[*Codeword—if any*] .....

Addressed to PRIORITY NEW DELHI

telegram No. ..... *(date)* .....

And to .....

repeated for information to UKMIS NEW YORK; WASHINGTON

.....

Saving to .....

MIPT

MIDDLE EAST

PRIME MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS

Thank you for your message of 22 November. I am most grateful for the help and support which the Indian representative at the Security Council has given to enable the resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom to be passed. I hope and believe that the passage of this resolution can make a material contribution towards the settlement which is so much in the interests of both our governments.

ENDS

Commonwealth Office
S.W.1

CONFIDENTIAL

24th November, 1967

Dear Palliser,

We spoke earlier about telegram No. 3386 of 23 November from U.K. Mission New York, in which Lord Caradon asked that a special message of thanks should be conveyed to the Government of India for their assistance in bringing about the passage of our Resolution on the Middle East. We have been in consultation with the Foreign Office, and agree that it would be most helpful if the Prime Minister would agree to send a personal message of thanks to Mrs. Gandhi. It is unlikely that Mrs. Gandhi would take as much notice of a message from anyone other than the Prime Minister, especially as he wrote to her at an earlier stage to enlist the co-operation of the Indian Government.

I should be grateful if you would seek the Prime Minister's approval to the attached draft message being sent.

Since this will need to be handled over the weekend, I am sending a copy of this letter and of the draft telegram to the Resident Clerk.

Yours ever,

David Brighty

(A. D. BRIGHTY)
Private Secretary

F.O. informed of appl. 25/11. Dy.

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.

Subject

Middle East

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No T307/67.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A

PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

TELNO. 2523 26 NOVEMBER 1967 (S.A.D.)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO NEW DELHI TELEGRAM NO.2523 OF 26 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM. MIDDLE EAST.

PRIME MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 22 NOVEMBER. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP AND SUPPORT WHICH THE INDIAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS GIVEN TO ENABLE THE RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM TO BE PASSED. I HOPE AND BELIEVE THAT THE PASSAGE OF THIS RESOLUTION CAN MAKE A MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE SETTLEMENT WHICH IS SO MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS.

ENDS.

CROSEC

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C.O. S.A.D.
M.E.W.U.N.D.

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.

SSSSS

I agree
the message
Hw

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

R. see the letter below:
have you any comments, please,
on the draft message at flag
'A'.

D.
24/11.

File

Middle East
(Arab/Israel Pt 8)

CONFIDENTIAL

November 27, 1967

The Prime Minister had a very brief exchange after Dinner at Chequers with the Canadian Prime Minister about the Middle East.

Mr. Pearson said that he had been immensely impressed with the contribution made at New York by Lord Caradon. He himself had never seen so many reports as he had been receiving from the Canadian representative there, Mr. Ignatieff. But he welcomed the close relationship between Mr. Ignatieff and Lord Caradon, "who is building himself a big reputation in New York".

Top Copy on
Canada Mar '65

A.M. Palliser.

D.J.D. Maitland, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

Middle East Pt 8.

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 Third Avenue, NEW YORK, N.Y.

P.U.S.

4 December, 1967

Dear Paul,

The Minister of State will shortly be addressing to the Secretary of State a despatch on the proceedings in the Security Council which finally ended in the unanimous vote in favour of the British Resolution. What such a despatch does not do justice to is the quite extraordinary degree to which this success was due to Lord Caradon's energy, persistence, persuasive personal diplomacy and iron nerve. Given the general attitude of U.N. members towards the U.K. over most contentious issues, it was little short of miraculous when fifteen yellow pencils went up to produce the unanimous vote in the Security Council for the British proposals.

2. Foremost in Lord Caradon's praise has been the U.S. Mission from Goldberg downwards, who have readily agreed that many of the doubts that they felt and expressed during the operation had proved that Lord Caradon was right and they were wrong. The U.S. and Canadian press has been more friendly and more appreciative of the importance of the success than most of the British press seem to have been.

3. This has been the only occasion which most of the members of our Delegation can remember when Delegation after Delegation came up to congratulate us in the days following the Resolution; and when a friendly farewell visit from Riad is balanced by a friendly personal letter from Eban, one really could not have hoped for more in this imperfect world. What to me was the final cherry on the top of the cake was the report that General de Gaulle was furious at the British success in a role that he had privately hoped at one stage La France would play.

4. Lord Caradon has always been emphatic that the foundations for the success were of course the Secretary of State's courageous speeches both in the Special Session and in the current General Assembly. But taking on from there, he has put in a professional performance the like of which I personally have never seen. He was always on the move seeing new people all the time and previous contacts again and again, at all hours of the day and night. The

/two

Sir Paul Gore-Booth, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.,
FOREIGN OFFICE

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL

two highlights in my opinion were firstly the way in which he won the two Latin Americans over after Goldberg's rough handling had put up their backs; and secondly, the courage and judgement with which he withstood the advice of so many delegations that it was better to vote immediately on the Friday and get nine votes rather than on two occasions to give the Russians the time they asked for (and in which they could so easily have made serious mischief) but which in fact ended in their joining the unanimous vote for our resolution.

5. It was good to see from the Secretary of State's personal congratulations that he very well understood both the magnitude of the British success and the exceptional personal efforts which the Minister of State had made to secure it, but I feel I must place my first hand impressions on record.

6. Lord Caradon has, of course, <u>not</u> seen this letter but if he had done so, I know he would have wished me to add that Peter Hope was an indefatigable lieutenant at his side throughout the whole operation and that Stephen Egerton, our Middle East Desk Officer, never flagged in cool and reliable ground work.

Yours ever

Leslie

(L.C.Glass)

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL

En Clair

IMMEDIATE WARSAW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 821 22 December 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Warsaw Meeting of Foreign Ministers' of 'Socialist' States.

The communiqué released today (embargoed until 1800 GMT) at the close of the meeting, states that from 19-21 December the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union and the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia and Rumania met in Warsaw. They discussed in detail the development of the situation in the near East. They noted the continuing tension in the near East, where Israel still occupies Arab territory.

2. The communiqué notes that "behind the continuing and successfully maintained tension are lurking the far-going plans and intentions of particular imperialist circles, above all the United States, aiming to bring back neo-colonialist order in the Arab East, characterised by a basic hostility towards the interests of the people of this region. To this end attempts have been made to transform the Mediterranean into a region of aggressive policy".

3. The communiqué expressed support for the Arab States who are conducting "a just struggle against imperialist and neo-colonialist machinations against their rights and interests against their independence and State sovereignty, against national unity, against social and economic progress. The communiqué expressed support for Arab endeavours to reach a solution of the crisis and to achieve unity of action against "the hostile policy of neo-colonialism and imperialist aggression". The Ministers expressed their support for the idea of a conference of Heads of Arab States in Rabat.

4. The communique continues that "the participants of the Conference unanimously stressed that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territory to positions before 5 June is the principal and essential condition for securing the return and consolidation of peace in the near East. In this connection, the Ministers pointed to the great importance of carrying out the Security Council's resolution of 22 November and of the immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied territory and they stressed the inadmissibility of securing territory by means of war. All interpretations whose aim is to weaken this basic element of the Security Council resolution are contrary to its letter and spirit. The Ministers stressed at the same time the necessity of all States who are members of the United Nations in this region recognising the right of each one of them to existence as an independent national state in conditions of peace and security". Israeli action in keeping occupied territory is condemned.

5. The communiqué concludes by stating that the Ministers exchanged views concerning possible measures to solve the problems of the Middle East within the framework of the Security Council resolution and expressed support for the newly established Yemeni Republic. "Discussions took place in a spirit of complete unity and close, friendly cooperation".

6. Foreign Office please repeat as necessary.

Mr. Brimelow
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Northern Dept.

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file

Israel Pt 8

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 3290 19 NOVEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 3290 OF 19 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES AND WASHINGTON.

MYTEL NO 3289:
MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF U K DRAFT RESOLUTION EXPANDED TO INCLUDE POINTS FROM THE PROPOSED LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT (MYTEL TO RIO NO 60 OF 16 NOVEMBER):-

BEGINS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

EXPRESSING ITS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

CONSIDERING THAT ALL MEMBER STATES HAVE AN INESCAPABLE OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE PEACE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE,

CONSIDERING FURTHER THAT THE CEASE-FIRE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ACCEPTED BY THE STATES CONCERNED IS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

EMPHASISING ITS CONVICTION THAT NO STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE BASED ON THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE,

EMPHASISING THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR AND THE NEED TO WORK FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN WHICH EVERY STATE IN THE AREA CAN LIVE IN SECURITY,

EMPHASISING FURTHER THAT ALL MEMBER STATES IN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A COMMITMENT TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER,

1. AFFIRMS THAT THE FULFILMENT OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES REQUIRES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE APPLICATION OF BOTH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

/(1) WITHDRAWAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RESOLUTION ADOPTED
22.11.67.

(!) WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELi ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT:

(!) TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE:

2. AFFIRMS FURTHER THE NECESSITY

(A) FOR GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA:

(B) FOR ACHIEVING A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM:

(C) FOR GUARANTEEING THE TERRITORIAL INVIOLABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA, THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARISED ZONES:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PROCEED FORTHWITH TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THE STATES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN THIS RESOLUTION:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

5. DECIDES TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY RELYING ON THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE AREA.

ENDS.

F O PASS FLASH BUENOS AIRES 94 AND RIO DE JANEIRO 69.

LORD CARADON

SENT: 2025Z/19 NOVEMBER.
RECD: 2025Z/19 NOVEMBER.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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SECRET

PM's talk with Mr McEwan, PM Australia Nov 23.2.67 Extract

Suez Canal

3

In answer to a question from Mr. McEwen, the Prime Minister explained that the Foreign Secretary had urged the Egyptians, following the resumption of diplomatic relations (which had been broken off originally over Rhodesia and not as a result of the Arab/Israeli war), to open the Southern half of the canal in order to get our ships out as a first step. The Egyptians were still taking the line that the canal could not be re-opened until the Israelis had withdrawn from the East bank. The Israeli position was, however, still that they must secure recognition by the Arabs and freedom of passage through the Canal before withdrawing from the East bank. The Prime Minister said that he thought the solution to the Arab/Israel problem fell into two parts; the recognition of Israel by the Arabs in return for withdrawal from the East bank; and arrangements for the return of the Arab refugees against the right of passage for the Israeli ships through the Canal. But Israel for the moment was still insisting that all aspects of the problem had to be dealt with together. Mr. Hasluck said he felt that a solution to the Arab/Israel problem had to be sought in stages.

In answer to Mr. McEwan the Prime Minister said that our estimate of the cost to us of the Arab/Israel war and the closure of the Suez Canal was in the region of £200 million. This took account of the temporary loss of Middle East oil and the loss at the same time of Nigerian supplies which had compelled us to purchase higher cost oil; of the increased transport costs and also of the loss of exports.

Mr. Hasluck asked whether we thought that the Soviet Union were using their influence with the Arabs. The

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Mr. Hasluck asked whether we thought that the Soviet Union were using their influence with the Arabs. The Prime Minister said that we had recently found them relatively helpful behind the scenes. But in public they clearly felt that they had to support the Egyptian line.